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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a number of Miami business leaders proposed the
creation of a Latin American stock exchange in Miami.' Some of
the proponents envision a full service stock market trading in
1. Jeffrey S. Solochek, Local Backers Urge Action on Latin American Stock Ex.
change, MIAMI TODAY, Sept. 7, 1995, at 23.
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Latin American securities,2 while others suggest a restricted
"private" or "offshore" exchange limited to institutional investors
and non-U.S. citizens.3 A third group proposes an electronic
service bureau that initially trades in financial information, but
aspires to assist in the settlement and facilitation of trades.4
Although there are major differences between each of these
proposals and a number of local business leaders question the
viability of a full-service exchange, there is a groundswell of
support for the exchange concept locally and throughout Latin
America. All proponents do agree that such an exchange would
greatly benefit Miami.' Irrespective of the different proposals,
the overriding common goal of the local proponents is to estab-
lish Miami as the second largest capital market in the United
States.7
The main hurdle to a Latin American exchange in Miami is
the application of U.S. securities laws to Latin American compa-
nies. The central conflict involves federal registration require-
ments which mandate extensive disclosure of an issuer's opera-
tions. The Security and Exchange Commission (Commission or
SEC) supports the internationalization of securities markets and
has worked closely with a number of foreign issuers to facilitate
their entry into the U.S. securities market.8 In addition, the
Commission introduced a number of rule changes that lessen the
disclosure obligations of foreign firms.9 However, the SEC still
maintains a fundamental commitment to both the disclosure
concept and the U.S. disclosure scheme."i
The availability and quality of financial information pro-
vides the foundation of a successful capital market. For instance,
the principle of disclosure provides the main source of trust and
2. See LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PRIVATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT, A
NOTE ABOUT Us, FINANCING AND PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA, (Miami, Fla.)
Nov. 1992. This proposal includes Caribbean markets.
3. See James D. Whisenand, Florida and Miami as an Emerging International
Merchant Bank/Capital Markets Center (Aug. 10, 1995) (on file with the U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV.).
4. See CYBERPORT MIAMI: A PROPOSAL FOR THE AMERICAS, (Jan. 8, 1996) (on
file with the U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.) [hereinafter CYBERPORT MIAMI].
5. Solochek, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 172-173, 179-192 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
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confidence which investors place in the U.S. securities mar-
ket." Further, the concept of complete disclosure of financial
information has been embraced by regulators and companies
world-wide.12 Despite this acceptance, many criticize the U.S.
disclosure scheme as rigid and obsolete.'" In fact, some experts
see the U.S. regulatory approach as a barrier to the internation-
al integration of securities markets. 4
This Comment explores the baseline of financial disclosure
through a discussion of the competitive efforts to attract foreign
capital to U.S. markets. An understanding of these issues offers
insight into the proper strategy to establish a Latin American
Exchange in the United States. Part I of this Comment discuss-
es the internationalization of securities trading and Latin
America's participation in the global market. Part II introduces
the proposal for a Miami-based, full service Latin American
Stock Exchange and discusses the applicable federal regulatory
regime. Part III explores the issue of complete financial disclo-
sure. Part IV presents an alternative proposal for a private "off-
shore" market dealing exclusively in international securities.
Part V considers the proposal to create an "informational" ex-
change and discusses the ability of the United States to effec-
tively regulate international securities trading. Finally, Part VI
concludes that either a Latin American "stock" or "information-
al" exchange would not only succeed in establishing Miami as a
major capital market, but would also advance efforts to integrate
hemispheric securities markets. This conclusion supports a poli-
cy shift to a regional disclosure system which focuses more on
market transparency than the uniform disclosure of financial
information.
II. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS AND
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EMERGING MARKETS OF LATIN
AMERICA
The single factor most likely to change the scope of securi-
ties regulation in the United States is the internationalization of
the securities market.'5 The main hurdle to foreign entry into
11. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
15. See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach
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U.S. securities markets is the application of the federal securi-
ties laws which implement an extensive registration and dis-
closure scheme. A number of commentators have argued that
the disclosure system should be overhauled or abandoned alto-
gether. Joel Seligman, in a recent article, noted that differences
between U.S. and foreign approaches to securities regulation
make it difficult, if not impossible, to integrate regulatory mech-
anisms without an overhaul of the mandatory disclosure sys-
tem.1"
Ultimately, as Seligman suggests, the trend toward interna-
tionalization may pose a type of "Hobson's choice" for the United
States. Either traditional standards to protect individual inves-
tors will be maintained, risking that U.S. issuers will increasing-
ly sell abroad, or there will be an erosion of the disclosure stan-
dard, creating greater risk for the individual investor." At the
core of the debate is not only the question of whether the dis-
closure system is still necessary to protect the individual inves-
tor,18 but also whether it is an essential asset that if lost would
detract from the pre-eminence of the U.S. market.19
to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 652
(1995). While international emerging markets have drastically changed the way secu-
rities are sold, U.S. participation in international markets is nothing new. In fact,
the period before the New Deal's adoption of the federal securities laws witnessed
the first significant, and distinctly unsatisfactory, experience of U.S. public invest-
ment in foreign securities. Id. at 654. Between 1923 and 1930, American investors
purchased close to $6.3 billion in foreign bonds. Id. Then, in rapid order, the col-
lapse of the world economy led to substantial depreciation of over ninety percent of
all foreign bonds sold in the United States. Id. For instance, by December 1931, the
aggregate market price for fourteen Latin-American nations' bonds was twenty-six
percent of their face value. Id. Peruvian bonds were selling at less then seven per-
cent of par. Id.
16. Id. at 653.
17. Id. at 663.
18. The New York Stock Exchange argues that if regulatory adjustments are
not implemented to allow U.S. exchanges to fully participate in the growth of in-
ternational trading, the U.S. will lose its pre-eminence among world capital markets.
James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropri-
ate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S58, S58-59 (1994). But cf. Richard Breeden, Foreign
Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of Economic Transformation, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S77, S78 (1994) (criticizing NYSE proposals as a "free pass" to
foreign companies).
19. James R. Silkenat, Overview of U.S. Securities Markets and Foreign Issuers,
17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S4, S5 (1994). These commentators indicate that the regula-
tory costs involved in entering the U.S. markets are lower than before. Id. They also
point-out that not only has the SEC made significant adjustments to the disclosure
requirements in order to attract foreign firms, but regulators have successfully facili-
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International firms are increasingly raising capital in the
United States and the emerging markets of Asia and Latin
America are driving this movement.0 The main attraction of
these emerging markets lies in their potential for economic
growth.21 Not only are many of these foreign countries the stars
of the developing economic world, but their growth potential now
exceeds even the mature industrial economies.22
Latin American markets provide unique insight into the
benefits and pitfalls of investing in developing countries. Despite
increasing interest in Latin American securities, these markets
lagged behind other emerging nations in economic growth and
foreign investment.2" This pattern developed from political and
tated the transition of foreign companies into the U.S. disclosure system by helping
these companies to understand how the system works. Id. Finally, proponents of the
disclosure standard insist that maintaining confidence in the market through princi-
ples of full disclosure and investor protection is the premier reason that capital is
available in such quantities in the U.S. market. Id. at S6. Investors trust that the
U.S. markets are fair. Id.
20. See Antoine W. van Agtmael, Investing in Emerging Markets, in THE
WORLD'S EMERGING STOCK MARKETS: STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT, REGULATIONS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 17 (Keith KH. Park & Antoine W. van Agtmael eds., 1993). For in-
stance, in 1980 emerging markets had a combined market capitalization rate of only
$78 billion. Id. at 25. By 1991, market capitalization increased to $628 billion. Id.
Not only did emerging markets exhibit staggering growth in dollar terms, but their
real share of global capitalization doubled. Id.
21. Id. at 27-28. Traditional arguments in support of investment in emerging
markets include risk diversification, high economic growth, expansion of the invest-
ment orbit to select "winners," access to some of the most competitive global pro-
ducers, limited international investment and low levels of institutional ownership. Id.
at 17. One commentator indicated that although international investment has "dis-
covered" the emerging markets, most of the traditional reasons remain valid. Id.
Mature economies also have the most transparent securities markets. Thus, the
market price of market securities, in theory, reflects their "true" value. Emerging
markets securities, to the degree that their securities markets are less transparent,
are discounted due to the lack of perfect information. Thus, these securities arguably
contain inherent price growth potential that may be realized as their own markets
become more transparent. Of course, the lack of transparency also indicates a higher
degree of risk.
22. Initially, access to vast labor pools, cheap land and limited environmental
regulation drove economic growth in the emerging markets. Id. at 23. Also, machin-
ery tends to be modern and technologically advanced because of the late industrial-
ization of many of these countries. Id. These advantages, combined with a shift in
emphasis to service and technology based economies, have paved the way for indus-
trial growth. Id. In addition, most of these countries shifted their focus from the
debt to the equities markets. Id. at 27-28. As a result, new listings, rights offerings,
and the wave of privatizations have significantly increased the supply of capital. Id.
Thus, the cost of capital has declined, permitting many emerging markets to main-
tain a competitive edge. Id. at 23.
23. Id. at 19.
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economic choices that were designed to limit direct foreign in-
vestment.24
In the late 1960s a wave of economic nationalism swept over
Latin America. 5 As one commentator noted, "many Latin
American countries feared becoming dependent on foreigners for
their economic, and consequently, political stability .... "2' As
a result, many Latin American governments adopted foreign in-
vestment laws (FILs) that severely restricted foreign invest-
ment.2 7 Two key policies were uniformly embraced across the
region. First, many "basic" or key industries in Latin America
were nationally operated and owned.28 Second, Latin American
nations adopted severe restrictions on foreign investment, in-
cluding limitations or outright prohibitions on foreign ownership
of local corporations.29 In addition, these countries virtually
eliminated displacement of local ownership by foreign capital.0
24. See Ricardo J. Diez, Securities: Problems in Selling Securities in Latin
American Private and Public Markets, in MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: INVEST-
MENT, TECHNOLOGY, TAx, LABOR AND SECURITIES: EUROPEAN, NORTH AND LATIN
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 333 (Alain A. Levasseur & Enrique Dahl eds., 1986) (sur-
veying restrictive foreign investment laws (FILs) in Latin America).
25. Id.
26. Mark B. Baker & Mark D. Holmes, An Analysis of Latin American Foreign
Investment Law: Proposals for Striking a Balance Between Foreign Investment and
Political Stability, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991). Latin American fears
of foreign domination of the economies is rooted in their collective experience with
the United States. See id. (quoting Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Echeverrian Wall: Two
Perspectives on Foreign Investment and Licensing in Mexico, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135
(1982)) (partially reprinting an allegory "which told of the 'Giant People who roamed
the North' in reference to greedy U.S. investors who took much in the way of re-
sources from the people of Mexico and left them with very little gold and skills in
return.").
27. Baker & Holmes, supra note 26, at 9.
28. Mexico reserved to State ownership enterprises such as petroleum, basic
petrochemicals, railroads, electricity, nuclear power and communications. See Diez,
supra note 24, at 333.
29. Id. Mexico required local ownership in the following industries: radio and
television, transportation, timber, gas distribution, insurance, investment, and some
petrochemicals. Id. Venezuela and other Andean Pact nations have similar exclusions
and, in addition, bar foreign investment in internal marketing of goods and certain
professional services. Id. In Brazil, foreign portfolio investors could invest only
through the Brazil Fund or a limited number of specialized funds. See Resolution
1289, promulgated by the CMV in March 1987, or Decree 4131 of September 1962
which first allowed foreign portfolio investment. Andre Pires de Oliveria Dias, Brazil,
in THE WORLD'S EMERGING STOCK MARKETS: STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT, REGULA-
TIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES (Keith K.H. Park & Antoine W. van Agtmael eds., 1993).
30. Diez, supra note 24, at 335. Mexico required government authorization for
foreign acquisition of twenty-five percent or more of an existing company, or forty-
nine percent of its fixed assets. See id.; General Resolution No. 5 of the National
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Latin American governments also instituted procedures for plac-
ing investments, which caused excessive paperwork and exten-
sive delays.3 Some countries imposed cumbersome bureaucrat-
ic oversight on foreign investors postapproval.32 Most experts
regard these application and approval requirements as specifi-
cally designed to discourage, rather than control, foreign invest-
ment.33 Not surprisingly, this resulted in a mass exodus of for-
eign capital from the region.34
Despite the significant withdrawal of foreign equity invest-
ment, Latin America experienced a period of high growth during
the 1960s and 1970s."5 This growth, fueled primarily by inter-
national debt, "gradually fossilized."38 One writer attributed
this to "inefficient import substitution (rather than export orien-
tation) and a high degree of government intervention, which
sought a 'soft' path to economic development by creating state
Commission of Foreign Investment of July 25, 1984 (Mex.). Such authorization was
difficult to obtain in practice. See Diez, supra note 24; General Resolution No. 4 and
8 of the National Commission of Foreign Investment of July 25, 1984 (Mex.). Pur-
chases in violation of the ownership limits resulted in recision of the transaction.
Diez, supra note 24, at 335. Exceptions were permitted but rare. Id. In Venezuela it
was virtually impossible for a foreigner to buy into a locally owned company. Id.
Approval of such acquisitions were seldom granted and then only in bankruptcy.
Even then, the company would remain a "national" company which under Venezue-
lan law required eighty percent local ownership. Id. Argentina conditioned approval
of a foreign acquisition of the existing shares of a local investor on "a clear benefit
to the national economy." Id. at 336.
31. In Argentina, a foreign investor needed Executive approval to acquire a lo-
cally owned company with a net worth in excess of $20 million. Companies with a
net worth between $5 million and $20 million were required to obtain approval from
the Ministry of the Economy. Id. Argentina permitted foreigners to trade on its
national exchange without approval or registration provided, however, that (1) acqui-
sitions do not convert a company into a domestic enterprise of foreign capital, (2)
holdings of individual foreign investors are limited to $2 million or two percent of
the capital of the local company, and (3) total foreign purchases are limited to twen-
ty percent of the capital. Id.
32. See van Agtmael, supra note 20, at 12. For instance, Mexico required after-
the-fact registration for broad categories of persons and events, including: (1) foreign-
ers who made regulated investments in Mexico; (2) Mexican companies in which
foreign investors took shares; (3) Mexican trusts in which foreigners participated;
and (4) stock certificates owned by, or pledged to, foreigners. Id. at 12-13.
33. In fact, some Latin American countries developed a second, or fast track,
for foreign investments in high priority industries. Diez, supra note 24, at 336.
34. Id. In tandem with the substantive restrictions on ownership, many Latin
American countries adopted similarly severe restrictions on the outflow of capital
that effectively blocked foreign access to the return on their investments. Id. at 333.
35. van Agtmael, supra note 20, at 24.
36. Id.
592 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3
monopolies, private cartels, and uncompetitive labor legisla-
tion.""7 Furthermore, over-indebtedness at both national and
corporate levels created a debt crisis which led to "a decade of
stagnation and restructuring."
38
In response, Latin Americans returned to the international
equities markets. Antoine van Agtmael noted that Latin Ameri-
cans "embraced (or were forced to accept) monetary discipline,
trade liberalization, deregulation and a private sector focus... "
in order to attract foreign capital9.3  Restrictions on the level of
foreign ownership,' approval of foreign investment,4 repara-
tions of profits and capital,42 barriers to reinvestment,' and
access to local exchanges dissipated or were completely re-
moved." Most Latin American nations created tax and foreign




40. The 1989 revision of the 1976 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and
Regulate Foreign Investment relaxed restrictions of foreign ownership. See Felicia
Morrow, Mexico, in THE WORLD'S EMERGING STOCK MARKETS: STRUCTURE, DEVELOP-
MENT, REGULATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 229 (Keith KH. Park & Antoine W. van
Agtmael eds., 1993). Foreigners now may own up to one hundred percent in seventy-
three percent of Mexico's economic sectors. Id. In thirty-six other sectors previously
closed, including insurance, foreigners may now hold up to forty-nine percent. Id.
Foreigners are now permitted to hold a thirty percent stake in Mexican banks. Id.
Venezuela essentially grants the foreign investor the same rights as a domestic in-
vestor. Luis E. Mum, Venezuela, in THE WORLD'S EMERGING STOCK MARKETS: STRUC-
TURE, DEVELOPMENT, REGULATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 293 (Keith K.H. Park &
Antoine W. van Agtmael eds., 1993). Argentina, likewise, has removed most owner-
ship restrictions and does not discriminate between foreign and national capital.
Euardo Tapia, Argentina, in THE WORLD'S EMERGING STOCK MARKETS: STRUCTURE,
DEVELOPMENT, REGULATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 321 (Keith K.H. Park & Antoine
W. van Agtmael eds., 1993). In Brazil, Institutional investors are now allowed to set
up "omnibus accounts" which are essentially portfolios of one or more shares held in
local custody. Pires de Oliveria Dias, supra, note 29.





45. Even most Latin American countries which have attempted to maintain
control over foreign ownership of local businesses have instituted favorable tax and
exchange rate policies. See Muro, supra note 40; Jaime Valenzuela, Chile, in THE
WORLD'S EMERGING STOCK MARKETS: STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT, REGULATIONS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 305, 318 (Keith K.H. Park & Antoine W. van Agtmael eds., 1993)
(indicating that restrictive Chilean foreign investment regulations incorporate incen-
tives to foreign investment through a preferential tax rate and guaranteed access to
the Foreign Exchange Market).
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the wave of privatizations in Latin America sparked the unprec-
edented flow of investment into Latin American equities mar-
kets." Experts agree that the flow of capital has positively im-
pacted the region.47 Corporate earnings, investments, and pur-
chasing power are on the rise.' More importantly, increased
investment has accelerated economic integration within Latin
America."'
Arguably, increased investment in Latin American securi-
ties has also positively addressed regional fears concerning for-
eign interference in and control of local economies. The historical
basis of these Latin American fears is set in a thin market domi-
nated by organized investors. This, of course, is the antithesis of
a liquid and diverse market. What seems counter-intuitive, and
yet is quite true, is that liquid and diverse markets favor man-
agement control.50 For instance, an increase in American De-
pository Receipts (ADRs)s' ownership of foreign stocks, al-
though an increase in foreign investment, also suggests enhance-
ment in the liquidity and diversity of the market for those secu-
rities shares. Thus, diverse foreign ownership is less likely to be
organized into an effective voting block." Management control
is favored as a result.Y3
46. The Argentinean privatization process retired approximately $7.3 billion of
the country's external debt through debt to equity swaps. Valenzuela, supra note 45,
at 327. This represented approximately twelve percent of Argentinean debt with
commercial banks. Id. Mexican private banks were auctioned in 1991 and 1992 and
are now open to a limited thirty percent foreign ownership. Morrow, supra note 40,
at 275.
47. Tapia, supra note 40, at 327.
48. van Agtmael, supra note 20, at 25.
49. Id.
50. See Alan R. Palmiter, Symposium: Securities Regulation: The Shareholder
Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 904
(1994) (indicating that dissatisfied public shareholders who "have a liquid market
into which to sell their shares, traditionally vote with management . . .
51. See infra note 66 for a description of ADR programs.
52. See Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional
Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994)
(indicating that the "exit option of selling into a liquid securities market further
reduce[s] the likelihood that even large shareholders will organize to resist manage-
ment . . .").
53. Of course, if foreign ownership is seated in a limited number of institu-
tions, management is more susceptible to outside foreign control. Since disclosure
provides the underpinnings for a liquid and diverse market, and, as a result, in-
creases diverse foreign investment, Latin American management arguably should
embrace a strict disclosure regime. Thus, the argument follows, disclosure and man-
agement control are directly related.
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While not every Latin American country embraced foreign
capital with equal vigor, all definitively moved in that direction.
By comparison, Chile, with arguably the strongest economy in
the region, opted to maintain a number of restrictions on foreign
investment despite incentives in areas of capital movement and
foreign exchange.' On the other hand, Argentina, like many
other Latin American nations faced with severe economic crises,
eliminated nearly all restrictions.55 In fact, Argentina no longer
makes any distinction between foreign and national invest-
ment.56 However, while most experts view investment in
Latin America as essential to regional success, not all agree that
the pace of international investment is entirely positive. In An
Analysis of Latin American Foreign Investment Law, Baker and
Holmes noted that "[alithough ... the FIL cycle has not yet run
its course, there is strong evidence to suggest that the pendulum
has swung completely in the other direction. Instead of being too
restrictive, Latin American FILs are becoming too permis-
sive."57 Although the return of foreign investment to Latin
America has occurred partially by necessity, it does not neces-
sarily suggest that Latin Americans are less concerned with
control over their economies or less distrustful of U.S. investor
motives.58
54. "Currently, the best alternative for foreign investors interested in investing
in Chile is through the Foreign Capital Investment Fund (FCIF)." Valenzuela, supra
note 45, at 318. Law 18,657 governs the organization of FCIFs and imposes several
restrictions:
. Capital cannot be redeemed through the first five years of operations, Re-
alized dividends and capital gains may be redeemed at any time;
The FCIF should have a local administrator;
An FCIF may neither invest more than ten percent of its assets in a sin-
gle issuer nor own more than five percent of the voting capital at any time. Id.
55. In November 1989, Argentina instituted a new foreign investment regime to
combat hyperinflation, high interest rates, unemployment, and uncompetitive indus-
tries. Tapia, supra note 40, at 326. This plan embraced foreign investment by guar-
anteeing equal treatment of national and foreign capital; doing away with the ap-
proval process for most industries; removing legal limits to the type and nature of
foreign investments and instituting a foreign exchange regime. Id.
56. Id.
57. Baker & Holmes, supra note 26, at 2.
58. In fact, recent events in Latin American markets, especially Mexico, have
given investors reason to pause. One advisor recently opined that "Latin America
today is only for the very brave, and only for the trader, not for the investor." Ted
Reed, Risky Business: The Bold See Opportunity; All Others Tread Carefully, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 10, 1995, at B22. In early 1994, share prices for Latin securities be-
gan to decline. For instance, the assassination of the presidential candidate of
Mexico's ruling party in the Spring of 1994 spurred a flight of capital from the
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The opportunities and dangers of foreign investment are
reflected in the recent performance of the Latin markets. During
the early 1990s Latin American investments became very popu-
lar among international investors. Between 1993 and 1994 U.S.
investors engaged in what has been described as "frenzied buy-
ing of a limited supply" of Latin American stocks.59 Prices rose
dramatically throughout the region. In December, 1994, a fifty
percent devaluation of the Mexican peso led to a proportionate
collapse of the Mexican stock market.' The stock markets in
developing nations followed suit.6 In some instances, Latin
American markets suffered a fate worse then Mexico.62 While
experts believe that this recent market collapse stems from
market volatility and correlated investor behavior, there are still
serious issues regarding the underlying integrity of the market
and the availability of information.
If recent history is a guide, the participation of foreign issu-
ers in the U.S. securities markets is expected to increase at a
rapid pace.63 The progression to the U.S. market, especially for
Mexican stock market. Juanita Darling, Mexico Stocks and Peso Tumble Amid Inac-
tion on Economic Plan, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at D2. By the winter of
1994, the stock index for the Mexican market dropped thirty percent; markets in
Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil fell fifteen percent; and Chile's stock index declined
ten percent. N.Y. Times Service, A Market Safety Net: Regulators in America Sign
Accord, MIAMI HERALD, June 8, 1993, at C1. Finally, the Mexican devaluation of the
peso in December of 1994 "scared investors away from every Latin American stock
market," further depressing securities prices.
59. The SEC estimated that U.S. holdings in Latin American stock doubled
from $2.6 billion in 1992 to $4.4 billion in 1993. N.Y. Times Service, supra note 58.
60. Roy C. Smith, The International Politics of Global Finance, WASH. Q., Au-
tumn 1995, at 117.
61. Id.
62. See Mariana Crespo, Latin Lessons, FIN. WORLD, Mar. 14, 1995, at 74 (dis-
cussing impact of Mexican market drop on Latin American Deposit Receipts).
63. For instance, in the first half of 1993, sixty-three new foreign stock issues,
valued at $5.5 billion were sold in the United States. Silkenat, supra note 19, at $7.
The 1993 sales figures for foreign stocks are approximately the same as the prior
year. Id. However, bond sales have been dramatically larger, almost double over
1992. Id. According to former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, "the U.S. public markets
are attracting an increasing number of foreign companies." International Markets and
Individual Investors: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, Federal Document Clearing House, Sep. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News file (prepared testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC). Since January 1,
1993, 191 foreign companies from twenty-six countries have entered the United
States reporting system, including countries from Latin America. Id. Since January
1, 1993, 224 foreign companies have registered more than $81 billion in securities in
329 U.S. public offerings. Id. Over $41 billion of that amount represents registered
equity offerings. Id. As of September 9, 1994, there were a total of 637 foreign re-
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Latin American issuers, is natural. There is more capital avail-
able in the United States, at less cost than anywhere else." As
noted, Latin Americans have historically depended on U.S. in-
vestment to fuel their economies. Furthermore, the integration
of hemispheric markets, as proclaimed by regional heads of state
at the Summit of the Americas, is a stated policy goal which
envisions a permanent U.S.-Latin American partnership. 5
Even though there are dramatic differences between the various
"Miami" exchange proposals, each plan stresses the integration
of hemispheric markets. This aspect is central to the common vi-
sion of Miami as the gateway to Latin America.
Despite the importance of hemispheric integration, the in-
tegrity of the Latin American Securities markets still raises
serious questions regarding investor protection. In fact, the very
reason that more capital is available via U.S. securities markets
is directly related to the stringent disclosure requirement man-
dated by U.S. law. The volatility of Latin American securities,
the high degree of U.S. investor correlation when trading these
securities, and the recent setbacks suffered by the Latin Ameri-
can securities markets argues for greater oversight and regula-
tion. The vast difference between the U.S. economy and the less
developed Latin American nations further underscores this prob-
lem. Thus, the "Hobson's choice" of integration versus investor
protection threatens the ability to ever attain a balance between
these important policy goals. It is in this light that the various
proposals to establish a Latin American stock exchange in Mi-
ami must be considered.
porting companies representing forty countries listed or quoted on the U.S. public
markets. Id.
64. Silkenat, supra note 19, at S4 n.1 (citing William E. Decker, The Attraction
of the U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers and the Alternative Methods of
Accessing the U.S. Markets: From the Issuer's Perspective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
S10, S11 (1994) (noting that United States is world's largest, most open market)).
65. See U.S. GOVT, SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS (1994), DECLARTATION AND PLAN
OF ACTION, PROMOTING PROSPERITY THROUGH ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND FIELD
TRADES NO. 10 (Aug. 10, 1995). Specifically, the Summit called for steps to promote
the liberalization of capital movement, uniform regulations that promote transparent
hemispheric markets, and regulatory efforts to integrate these markets. Id.
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III. ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT LATIN AMERICAN STOCK
EXCHANGE IN MIAMI: U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE
DISCLOSURE REGIME
A. Overview
U.S. investors purchase shares of foreign corporations
through mutual funds, ADRs,66 or directly from the home mar-
ket.67 Foreign firms invest in the U.S. market in three ways.
The foreign company may (1) attempt to raise capital through
the private placement of their securities similar to the procedure
available to domestic companies;68 (2) seek a listing on a U.S.
Stock exchange without a public offering in order to provide a
secondary market for circulating shares;69 or (3) choose to sell
their securities directly to U.S. investors in a public sale or offer-
ing.7" The rules governing each option vary; however, the main
66. The primary mechanism for purchasing foreign securities in the United
States is through a device known as an American Depository Receipt (ADR). Joseph
Velli, American Depository Receipts: An Overview, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S38, S38-
40 (1994). An ADR is simply a receipt issued by a U.S. depository bank which rep-
resents the underlying foreign security. Id. A foreign company establishes an ADR
program by appointing a U.S. depository bank to facilitate its entry into the U.S.
market. Id. There are essentially two types of ADR programs: sponsored and
unsponsored. Id. at S43. Sponsored ADRs, which are created by the foreign issuer,
are preferred. Unsponsored ADRs are now considered obsolete. In fact, since 1983
there have only been three new unsponsored ADRs established. Id. As one writer
noted, unsponsored ADRs are typically created by U.S.-investor demand without the
consent of the issuer, as compared to sponsored ADRs, which are established by a
non-U.S. issuer and are required for an exchange or NASDAQ listing. Inherent
problems with unsponsored ADRs include fees charged by depository banks for dis-
tributing dividends, lack of voting rights, and little or no information flow to inves-
tors and issuers. John R. Evans, ADRs and Opportunities for Investment in the
Emerging Asian and Latin American Equity Markets, in THE WORLD'S EMERGING
STOCK MARKETS: STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT, REGULATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 475-
76 (Keith K.H. Park & Antoine W. van Agtmael eds., 1993).
67. Cochrane, supra note 18, at S62 (indicating that institutional investors pur-
chase foreign securities in foreign markets).
68. See Decker, supra note 64, at S10.
69. Velli, supra note 66, at S38, S44 (1994). In order to list on an exchange it
is necessary to file a Form 20-F, Form 20-F, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 29,701, at
21,745 (1995), which, with some exceptions, mandates compliance with U.S. account-
ing and disclosure requirements. Velli, supra note 66, at S44.
This approach permits trading of the companies previously issued shares or
ADRs in the secondary market and is often a precursor to a public offering. See M.
Shane Warbrick, Practical Company Experience in Entering U.S. Markets: Significant
Issues and Perspectives from the Issuer's Perspective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S112,
S115 (1994).
70. See Decker, supra note 64, at S17; Velli, supra note 66, at S44. In order
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factor which companies appear to consider in choosing between
these alternatives depends on an issuer's willingness to meet the
requisite disclosures under U.S. law.71
B. The Full Service Exchange Proposal
While there are significant barriers to its implementation, a
permanent, full service exchange most directly embraces the
policy objective of complete U.S.-Latin integration and the con-
cept of complete disclosure. Detractors argue that the expense of
establishing a new exchange-based capital market is prohibitive
and the regulatory hurdles are insurmountable. 72  Further,
these critics claim that it is questionable whether such an ex-
change can compete with existing markets. 73 As one expert not-
ed, "building a bricks and mortar trading facility.., would just
repeat the New York Stock Exchange."74 This criticism is par-
ticularly relevant since the special niche of a Miami-based ex-
change targets companies, many of which would not presently
qualify under federal regulations for access to the U.S. securities
markets.75
The concept of a full-service exchange, however, is impor-
tant to our notions of a securities market, even if it is outdated
and obsolete.76 A full service exchange has an important sym-
for a foreign company to conduct a public offering in the United States it must file
a Form F-i, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 6952, at 6061 (Apr. 7, 1993), with the
SEC which requires compliance with accounting and disclosure procedures. Some
exceptions from these rules which are available to companies only listed on U.S.
exchanges are unavailable here.
71. Decker, supra note 64, at S44.
72. See Robert Johnson, Latin Stock Exchange: Is Its Time About To Come?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1996, at F1 (outlining full service exchange proposal);
Solochek, supra note 1 (discussing barrier posed by U.S. securities laws); see also
supra notes 150-160 (discussing foreign concerns regarding disclosure requirements).
73. Johnson, supra note 72, at Fl.
74. Id. (quoting James Whisenand). Compare the statement of an Inter Ameri-
can Development Fund official that active trading of Latin stocks on the NYSE sug-
gests that a specialized exchange would encourage further investor demand. Id.
75. See Whisenand, supra note 3. The efforts are geared to attract small to
medium size firms in the one to forty million dollar range. Id.
76. See Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the
Trading of Securities: the Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regu-
lation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 318 (1991). "Advocates of the electronic market
argue that there is no question, but that the financial markets of the future will be
electronic and that the floor of the New York Stock Exchange is destined to become
an historical relic." Id.
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bolic value as a market centerpiece." This belies the hope that
an exchange would "spawn an influx of Latin corporate
headquarters to Miami... that want to be part of a sort of little
Latin Wall Street . . . . "78 Proponents of the exchange, focusing
less on regional or global markets, emphasize the theme of a
U.S.-Latin American axis.79 In this light, a full service ex-
change represents more than just the market it serves, but the
permanence of U.S.-Latin American economic integration.s
Such a proposal seeks to establish the United States as a base to
supply Latin America's capital needs.8" Backers see the pro-
posed exchange as a source of "harmony" that will match the
financial and technological ability of the U.S. with the great
resources and talent of emerging Latin markets. 2 This view
envisions such an exchange as the primary, if not exclusive,
source of Latin American and Caribbean securities transactions.
The promoters of the full-service exchange believe they have
the necessary support. As one supporter claimed, the exchange
plans to file for permits with the SEC in the near future and
expects the necessary regulatory approvals to be granted in time
for a 1998 opening. 3 As the Wall Street Journal reported,
"[i]nitial plans call for a downtown Miami office with 25,000
square feet of space, about 50 broker-traders including a chief
executive hired from the management ranks of the New York
Stock Exchange, and a budget derived from the sale of seats
priced as low as $25,000.""4 Roberto Gonzalez-Pelaez, a sup-
porter of this effort, estimates that the exchange will require $20
million in start-up capital.85
A number of potential participants have expressed inter-
est.88 The president of at least one U.S. mutual fund company
with Latin American investments indicated that his company
77. See Johnson, supra, note 72 (noting that a full service exchange is "a true
business center" where people "visit, watch, talk and gather investment information
together . . . ").
78. Id.
79. See A Note About Us, supra note 2 (establishing a regional market exclu-










would purchase a seat.8" A spokesperson for the Inter American
Development Fund, also a potential investor, expects such an
institution to further spark U.S. investor interest in already
popular Latin securities.' Latin American firms are also likely
to find an exchange in Miami attractive. An attorney represent-
ing exchange proponents claimed that these companies will
benefit from enhanced liquidity and will "be the stars of an insti-
tution dedicated to them right in the heart of a huge, politically
stable and affluent Latin community." 9 Supporters estimate
initial listings of over 200 companies and a daily trading volume
as high as 500,000 shares a day.9" This is expected to double by
the year 2000.91
C. U.S. Securities Regulation
Federal law, however, poses a significant barrier to such a
plan. In addition to federal rules governing the formation and
operation of a trading exchange, a call for a traditional exchange
acknowledges acceptance of the principles of registration and
full disclosure which accompany entry and continuing access to
the U.S. securities markets. Proponents of the full-service ex-
change recognize the application of U.S. law, but view this as
desirable and beneficial. As Gonzalez-Paelez argues, an ex-
change operating under U.S. oversight will entice investors to
the market.9 2 This position, while perhaps true, does not ad-
dress the ability of Latin American issuers to participate in such
a market in the first place.
Foreign issuers entering the United States public markets,
usually through a public offering, are required to register under
the Securities Act of 1933, 9" the cornerstone of the federal dis-
87. Id. (quoting Thomas Herzfeld, chairman and president of Herzfeld and Com-
pany).
88. Id.




93. A public offering occurs when a company wants to come to the U.S. public
markets to raise funds. An offering requires registration with the SEC, usually on a
Form F-1. Form F-i, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 6952, at 6061 (Apr. 7, 1993). This
entails substantial disclosure of information relating to the company's operations. See
Frode Jensen III, The Attractions of the U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers
and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the U.S. Markets: From a Legal Perspective,
600 [Vol. 27:3
1996] LATIN AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE 601
closure policy. 4 The registration statement required under the
act includes a prospectus, the portion of the registration state-
ment delivered to the investor.95 If material facts are withheld
from the registration statement, or if an offer or sale of a securi-
ty is made without a registration statement, an investor may
challenge the issuer under the liability provisions of the 1933
Act. Thus, the foreign issuer runs the risk of being haled into
a United States court by a dissatisfied investor. In addition to
the extensive liability exposure, the issuer is also potentially
subject to extensive discovery. Further, the registration state-
ment, including the prospectus, must be approved by the SEC
before sales can be confirmed. 8 Thus, the SEC has great lee-
way in blocking or suspending a public offering if 1933 Act dis-
closures are inadequate or ignored.
In addition to the registration requirements, many foreign
issuers are faced with continuous disclosure obligations under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."9 Such disclosure is neces-
sary to ensure an issuer future access to the U.S. markets for
both public offerings and secondary transactions. Section 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act requires any issuer with securities
17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S25, S26 (1994). Form F-1 requires three years of income
and cash flow statements, two years of balance sheets, five years of selected finan-
cial information, and the accounting reconciliations. Id. at S30-31. This is a full
disclosure, long form registration statement, analogous to the domestic Form S-1,
which does not permit incorporation by reference. Id. at S30.
94. Jensen, supra note 93, at S76.
95. Id. at S30.
96. Id. See generally Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11-12. In addition, Rule 10b-5,
the SEC's antifraud provision, provides investors with additional protection.
97. See generally Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
98. Jensen, supra note 93, at S76.
99. Any issuer with securities listed on a U.S. stock exchange must register the
securities pursuant to section 12(b) of the Exchange Act. Any other issuer with as-
sets over $3 million on the last day of its most recent fiscal year, and an out-
standing class of equity securities held of record by 5000 or more persons, must
register the securities under Section 12(g). This latter registration may be terminat-
ed (a) when the number of shareholders of the class falls below 300 or (b) when the
number of such shareholders falls below 500 and the issuer's assets have not exceed-
ed $3 million at the end of each of the three latest fiscal years. Section 15(d) of the
Exchange Act, in turn, requires that the issuers of securities which have not been
registered under either Sections 12(b) or 12(g), but which have been registered under
the Securities Act in connection with their public offerings, comply with periodic
reporting requirements similar to those companies registered under Section 12. The
requirement is suspended for foreign issuers if the class of securities has fewer than
300 resident U.S. shareholders. In each case, qualification for termination must be
certified to the SEC on Form 15.
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listed on a national exchange to register under the Act."° In
addition, companies that are not listed on an exchange, but
which have in excess of 500 shareholders or $1 million is assets,
are also required to register under the 1934 Act.'0' The disclo-
sure mandated by the Act is outlined in Section 13 and general-
ly requires continuous filing of annual and quarterly reports."°
The 1934 Act, like the 1933 Act, contains a number of liability
provisions which permit shareholders to seek damages where
the shareholder relies on a false or misleading statement within
a filed document."° Finally, Rule 10b-5 liability protects share-
holders against fraud. This coverage extends to any materially
fraudulent statement in relation to the issuer's securities.1
4
For instance, the public listing alternative, 5 which incor-
porates the registration requirements under the 1934 Act, pro-
vides an issuer with access to the secondary U.S. securities mar-
kets by listing on U.S. exchanges."° In order to list on a U.S.
100. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12.
101. Id. § 12 (a), (g). However, Rule 12g-1 exempts an issuer with less then $5
million in assets from disclosure requirements.
102. Id. § 13.
103. Id. § 18, § 14.
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
105. Interestingly, many foreign companies ignore the listing alternative when
contemplating entry into the U.S. markets. Decker, supra note 64, at S16. The ad-
vantage of the listing approach prior to conducting a public offering is the company's
ability to develop a presence in the U.S. marketplace and prepare a document that
goes through the SEC registration process. Id. In addition, listing on a U.S. ex-
change enhances liquidity and thus adds value. Id. For example, a listing on the
New York Stock Exchange has meant a major revaluation for Teldfonos de Mexico
(TELMEX), a trend which could effect other Mexican issuers and result in a higher
multiple for the overall market. Morrow, supra note 40, at 265. If the company then
decides to go to the public markets, it is well positioned to do so. Id; Warbrick,
supra note 69. In fact, there are short form registration statements available once a
company is listed for a period of time. These statements incorporate by reference the
financial information that is included in the annual accounts required to be fur-
nished by these companies. Warbrick, supra note 69.
106. Decker, supra note 64, at S15. In addition to the federal and state regu-
lation, an issuer must meet the listing standards and comply with reporting and
other requirements of any U.S. exchange on which it shares will be listed. Alan S.
Mostoff, Application of U.S. Securities Laws to the Purchase and Sale in the U.S., in
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY, TAX, LABOR AND SECURI-
TIES: EUROPEAN, NORTH AND LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 347, 348 (Alain A.
Levasseur & Enrique Dahl eds., 1986). Certain exchanges provide alternative criteria
for foreign issuers. Listing standards for the New York Stock Exchange generally
require that an issuer have 2000 U.S. holders of 100 or more shares and have at
least one million shares worth at least $16 million publicly held in the U.S. Id.
Foreign issuers that cannot meet this requirement may list their securities on the
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exchange, the foreign issuer must register with the SEC on
Form 20-F, °7 an integrated annual report form with somewhat
less extensive disclosure then the comparable forms for domestic
issuers such as Forms 10 and 10-k."0 8
The disclosure requirements of Form 20-F are less extensive
in several respects. For example, issuers are not required to
report profits by business segment within annual reports. Issu-
ers are also not obligated to report information on salaries of
officers and directors on an individualized basis, unless the
issuers already publish such information." 9 In addition, for-
eign private issuers are exempt from the proxy rules under Sec-
tion 14 of the 1934 Act and foreign management is exempt from
the insider trading limitations of Section 16 of the 1934 Act."'
Furthermore, the securities of foreign private issuers are not
subject to the registration provisions of Section 12(g) if the class
of securities are held by fewer than 300 U.S. residents or the
issuer annually furnishes material information made available
in its home market."'
NYSE if they can meet the following requirements on a world wide basis: 5000
round lot shareholders, 2.5 million publicly held shares outstanding worth at least
$100 million. Id. The issuer must also have achieved a minimum of $25 million out-
standing or pre-tax income in each of the last three years, with cumulative pre-tax
income over the three year period of $100 million. Id. at 355. The American Stock
Exchange also provides an alternative set of standards. Id. at 336.
107. Form 20-F, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 29,701, at 21,745 (1995); see Form
F-I, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 6952, at 6061 (1995) (requiring disclosure of infor-
mation required by Part I, Item 17, and Item 18 of Form 20-F).
108. Form 20-F, under Items 17 and 18, mandates the disclosure of material in-
formation through financial statements and footnotes. Form 20-F, Item 17, 5 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 29,701, at 21,763 (Nov. 18, 1992); Form 20-F, Item 18, 5 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 29,701, at 21,764 (Nov. 18, 1992). Form 20-F requires inclusion
of audited consolidated financial statements, Form 20-F, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
29,701, at 21,745 (Nov. 18, 1992), with balance sheets for the two most recent fiscal
years, Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 229.3-19(a)(1) (1993), income statements, cash
flow statements, id. § 229.3-19(a)(2) (1993), and changes in shareholder equity, id. §
229.3-04 (1993). In addition, the SEC requires schedules providing supplemental de-
tails of accounts such as marketable securities, reserves, and property, plant and
equipment. M. Elizabeth Rader, Accounting Issues In Cross Border Securities Offer-
ings, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S129, S131 (1994).
109. Mostoff, supra note 106, at 353.
110. See Rule 3a12-3. A foreign private issuer does not include issuers in which
(1) more than fifty percent of the outstanding securities are held by U.S. residents,
(2) a majority of the executive officers or directors are U.S. citizens or residents, (3)
more than fifty percent of the assets are located in the United States, or (4) the
business is administered principally in the United States.
111. See Rule 12g3-2. Form 6-K requires the prompt furnishing of material infor-
mation which the issuer (1) is required to make public in its country of domicile, (2)
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Despite applicable exemptions, both registration under the
1933 Act and continuous disclosure obligations under the 1934
Act can prove burdensome to foreign issuers for a variety of
reasons. First, registration under federal laws is expensive.
Second, disclosure requirements under this regime, given differ-
ences between U.S. and foreign accounting systems, are difficult
to meet. Third, issuers often balk at the disclosure of sensitive
financial information generally protected in their home country.
For instance, while proponents of the Miami Exchange em-
brace full disclosure and transparent markets generally, detrac-
tors argue that small to mid-range firms in developing markets
will not be able or willing to accept the present U.S. regulatory
regime. For an exchange specializing in Latin American stocks
to work, critics argue, companies in the one to forty million
dollar range must list and trade. For firms of this size, the ex-
pense of registration is a significant concern. Further, new ven-
tures, especially those involving innovative technology, are dis-
closure sensitive." These arguments are underscored by the
fact that Latin American firms, as a matter of business practice,
traditionally shy away from disclosure of their operations and
business plans."'
IV. THE DISCLOSURE DEBATE
While there is still international resistance to complete
disclosure, a number of Latin American regulators have em-
braced this concept, and Latin issuers, for market reasons, have
come to accept its necessity. However, there is an important
distinction between financial disclosure and the maintenance of
the U.S. disclosure regime. As noted, despite the proven success
of the U.S. approach, this system has come under attack as an
unnecessary barrier to international securities trading.
has publicly filed with a foreign stock exchange, or (3) has distributed to its share-
holders. Form 6-K also requires English translations of versions or summaries of
information distributed to shareholders and material press releases, but does not
require translations of other information.
112. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
113. Telephone Interview with Roberto Gonzalez-Pelaez, President of Latin Amer-
ican Institute for Privatization and Development (Nov., 1995) (indicating Latin Amer-
icans fear disclosing business and proprietary information to U.S. investors). See
supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text (indicating Latin American foreign invest-
ment laws were motivated by distrust of foreign investors).
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Understanding the U.S. approach to securities regulation
requires an understanding of the historical background of securi-
ties trading in the United States. Congress passed the Securities
Acts in the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929.1 The
magnitude of the crash coupled with the ensuing great Depres-
sion shook the very roots of the U.S. economy. Investor confi-
dence in the securities market was virtually destroyed.11
Congress and the Roosevelt Administration responded to
this crisis by passing the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.6 This legislation instituted a com-
prehensive system of securities regulation which emphasized the
disclosure of material information." 7 In light of the public out-
cry after the collapse of the U.S. securities markets, this re-
sponse was remarkable since U.S. securities laws do not ap-
praise the fairness or attractiveness of the securities, but rather
look to the quality of market in which the securities are
sold."' The wisdom of this approach is evidenced not only by
comparison with state Blue Sky Laws,"1 but also through the
114. Jensen, supra note 93, at S26.
115. Id.
116. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., deals primarily with
public offerings by issuers and their controlling persons. It sets general disclosure
and antifraud standards and requires that securities be registered prior to the offer
for sale, unless an exemption applies. The fundamental purpose of the Act imple-
ments a philosophy of full disclosure. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230
(1988). The Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., governs secondary
market trading in securities, but also expands on the Securities Act's disclosure
requirements by requiring, among other features, continuous reporting. "The 1934
Act was designed to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices." Basic
Inc., 485 U.S. at 230 (citations omitted). The Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa
et seq., sets special requirements for debt securities which are supplemental to those
required by the Securities Act. Procedures under this statute are integrated into
Securities Act registration. Of particular interest to foreign borrowers is the require-
ment under this Act that at least one trustee be a U.S. corporation authorized to
execute trust powers and subject to U.S. regulation at either the federal or state
level. See Mostoff, supra note 106, at 348.
117. See Securities Act of 1933, U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (re-
quiring disclosure of material information); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78a-7711 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (requiring disclosure of material informa-
tion). Note that while Congress initially sought to re-instill trust and confidence in
the securities market, regulation under the Securities Acts has evolved as a mecha-
nism to foster "transparent" securities markets. See James R. Doty, The Role of the
Securities and Exchange Commission in an Internationalized Marketplace, 60
FoRDHAM L. REV. S77, S79 (1992). "'Transparency,' in its most technical sense, is
the degree to which real-time trade and quotation information are available to mar-
ket participants." Id.
118. Jensen, supra note 93, at S27.
119. Some states have enacted Blue Sky laws which are commonly known as
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enhanced reputation of the United States as the premier securi-
ties market in the world. 2 ' It is widely recognized, even by
critics, that the disclosure principle provides the great trust and
confidence which investors place in the U.S. market.
121
Richard C. Breeden noted that "the United States Market
has derived great strength from the simple proposition that
anyone wanting to compete for an investment dollar must issue
a balance sheet, an income statement and a statement of cash
flows prepared on standard terms."'22 Breeden's remarks sug-
gest that American investors must have a disclosure tool to
effectively compare foreign and domestic investments. While
some view standardized financial information as crucial to the
protection of U.S. investors, others label this approach protec-
tionist. To some extent, however, this perspective focuses on the
standardization of information rather than the quality or effec-
tiveness of disclosure.
The disclosure approach has its share of critics for other
reasons as well. The securities markets, in terms of both sophis-
tication and size, are far different than the markets of the
1920s. As one commentator noted, Wall Street in that era "pro-
.merit regulations." These statutes permit state administrators to block the market-
ing of a security if the sale of the security is found to be "unfair, unjust, inequitable
or oppressive . . . ." Seligman, supra note 15, at 672-73.
Blue Sky statutes generally reduce compliance burdens when securities are
registered with the SEC. Today, over forty statejurisdictions authorize registration by
coordination. Id. at 675-76. However, a residual tension between federal and state
securities law endures. While the federal mandatory disclosure system requires full
and complete disclosure of material information, virtually all states specify standards
for the denial, suspension, or revocation of registration. Id. at 678. In many states,
traditional "merit" regulations remains in force. Id. To some extent, states have
reduced the conflict between merit standards and actual or potential international
offerings by adopting a "marketplace exemption" from merit review for securities
listed on the exchanges. Some states also exempt securities traded in the over-the-
counter market. Id. at 681.
Inevitably, the application of merit standards to issuers selling securities
abroad should continue to shrink. Id. at 681. This is a consequence of the increas-
ingly international context of securities sales. Id. A concurrent system runs the risk
of becoming self-defeating. Id.
120. See Warbrick, supra note 69, at 113-15 (adopting U.S. GAAP in order to re-
gain confidence and trust in his firm's securities).
121. See generally Cochrane, supra note 18, at S58-59 (despite calls for changes
in disclosure system, the U.S. approach is the source of trust and confidence in the
U.S. securities market).
122. Richard C. Breeden, The Globalization of Law and Business in the 1990s,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 516 (1993).
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vided a securities trading market for a very small percentage of
the population, dominated by natural persons rather than insti-
tutional investors, and featuring domestic securities, human
trading intermediation, primitive financial economics, and rela-
tively few types of securities."2 The simple structure has long
been obsolete."124 The information revolution and the pre-
eminence of computers have transformed the way securities are
traded, even to the point where some question the usefulness of
traditional exchanges altogether.
By contrast, although institutional investors dominate secu-
rities trading,2 5 individual investors are participating in the
market in record numbers.'26 The United States has a larger
number, and a larger percentage, of individual investors than
any other nation. 27 Even before the enactment of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, institutional investors did not need mandatory
disclosure to protect themselves."2 Their bargaining power en-
sured access to information. However, it is widely recognized
that individual investors cannot effectively bargain for the same
information that is available to financial institutions."
Between 1987 and 1995, several market collapses shook the
international financial landscape."' However, none of these
cases caused a "world-wide financial crisis" of the magnitude of
the Great Depression."' These situations "seem to have been
created by the simple availability of a casino-like market place
.... 2 As one expert noted, this suggests not only that
"[m]arket forces and disciplines now rule the global econo-
my.. .,"3' but that the market is now "more powerful than
123. Seligman, supra note 15.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 657-58. Institutional investors own slightly over one-half of U.S. equi-
ties and are now responsible for sixty to eighty percent of trading on the New York
Stock Exchange. Id.
126. Id. at 659. While institutional ownership has increased spectacularly in the
post new deal period, so has individual ownership of U.S. securities. Id. A greater











national and international regulatory systems currently in
place." 1" Despite the increased international access to capital
and the benefits of international and regional integration, freer
markets and the attending volatility means "accepting increased
amounts of uncontrollable money flows, and increases in so
called speculative trading ... and greater risk to those acting as
market makers."" This increased risk is magnified in the
emerging markets.
Emerging markets "tend to be very thin and very frag-
ile."13 Further, despite the explosion in emerging market re-
search,137 information is unreliable and dated. 3 s As Debbie
Galant noted in a 1994 article, "[e]merging-markets research has
neither the depth nor the breadth that investors take for grant-
ed in mature markets."3 9 Additionally, as one expert noted,
"Irlumors tend to drive these markets more than actual
events.""4 There are also some built-in defects which are not
easily dealt with in an international forum. For instance, emerg-
ing market governments and companies have been known to
bring pressure on analysts for their criticism."" Many believe
that critical research reports can cause brokers to be cut out of
deals. 42 Thus, information issues are crucial.
Latin American markets and issuers reflect these problems.
The Latin American position is further complicated by its unique
dependence on the United States. Latin Americans have gener-
ally found themselves restricted to the U.S. markets." This
limitation is due to the significant participation of U.S. investors
in Latin offerings as well as the "small and relatively illiquid
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Debbie Galant, Too Much Too Soon, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1994, at
79 (quoting John Hsu, an emerging markets investment advisor).
137. A number of firms are in the process of building up their emerging market
section, which has placed a premium on analysts with experience in the area. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Gary Schieneman, director for Latin American Research for
New Smith Court). For instance, "[t]he stock of Baesa, the Pepsi bottler in Argenti-
na, was pummeled in 1992 after the company began packaging its soft drinks in
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markets" of these countries.' As a result, the regulatory
structures of many Latin American nations are patterned after
the U.S.'" Thus, countries like Argentina, Chile, and Mexico
have attempted to conform to the U.S. regulatory model.'"
However, critical differences between the U.S. structure and
Latin American systems exist. Inflation accounting is the most
important difference.'47 As Cesar Alvarez noted, other "[a]reas
requiring special care when reading financial statements from
[Latin American issuers] are deferred taxes, financial statement
disclosure, extraordinary items, earnings per share, equity ac-
counting, pre-operating and other cost and reserves for contin-
gencies.""' These are essentially the core disclosure issues,
demonstrating that integration is much more encompassing and
complex then similarly modeled regulatory regimes.
Foreign issuers facing U.S. disclosure and accounting re-
quirements are concerned about both the availability and sensi-
tivity of the requisite information.' 9 Availability concerns are
present when a company must assess how difficult it is to collect
information and whether the costs associated with presenting
that information is prohibitive. 5 °
For a first-time issuer, the U.S. registration process is an







150. Id. at S18. The amount of time necessary to complete the registration pro-
cess is also a significant concern. Some companies have been able to complete the
process within a few months. However, six months is a more reasonable estimate.
Id. at S22. This can be a grave concern if the issuer's need for funds is time sensi-
tive. Additionally, sometimes it can take a significant amount of time to complete
the reconciliation statements. In one reported case this process took almost eighteen
months. See Warbrick, supra note 69, at S113-15.
In addition to the difficulty in converting home account transactions to U.S.
GAAP, the company also needs to identify transactions for which U.S. GAAP may
not exist. See, e.g., Pat McConnell, Practical Company Experience in Entering U.S.
Markets: Significant Issues and Hurdles from an Advisor's Perspective, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. S120, S126 (1994) (government grants or concessions, such as those used
in Mexico to improve infrastructure); Warbrick, supra note 69, at S113-15 (special
tax accounting and reserves of certain foreign countries).
151. Jensen, supra note 93, at S34 (estimating the cost of a public offering to be
between $500,000 and $1 million).
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that in the long-run the availability issue is not much of a fac-
tor.'52 Companies committed to entering the U.S. markets will
put forth the effort necessary to obtain the required information.
Cost concerns are closely associated with the generation, not the
disclosure of financial data. 53 Once this material becomes
available, disclosure of company-specific information is not a
major impediment. Further, issuers in the private placement
market, as a practical matter, may have to provide most of this
information anyway in order to attract institutional inves-
tors."4
Disclosing sensitive business information, however, is often
a more important issue than the availability of information or
the cost of disclosure.'55 Although a number of non-U.S. compa-
nies prepare their primary financial statements using U.S. gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), the majority pro-
vide their home country financial statements along with an
audited reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.'56 The sensitive issues re-
sulting from the reconciliation are often what concerns these
non-U.S. companies."'
For instance, a foreign company may use an aggressive
revenue recognition approach that would be highlighted in a
reconciliation."5 A company may have a massive under-funded
pension plan, which, under U.S. GAAP would result in an in-
creased pension expense or a large pension liability or both."59
Other companies, by practice, may have large hidden reserves
which might, through reconciliation, result in reported losses or
gains that do not reflect actual performance."
An interesting example of the hidden reserve problem is
demonstrated by the automobile manufacturer Daimler-Benz
AG's entry into the U.S. market. Daimler-Benz was the first
German company to become publicly traded in the United
States. 6' This event was significant given enormous differenc-
152. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 64, at S18.
153. Id.
154. See infra notes 229-231 and accompanying text.




159. Id. at S18-19.
160. Id.
161. Breeden, supra note 18, at S85-91.
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es regarding disclosure requirements between the United States
and Germany.'62 It alleviated some of the pressure to overhaul
U.S. disclosure requirements as a means of attracting foreign
issuers.'63
As former SEC Commissioner Breeden noted, German ac-
counting policies permit companies to create "hidden re-
serves."' Although a company may earn profits during a par-
ticular period, German accounting permits the company to re-
duce earnings by creating generous reserves for potential future
adverse events.'63 Under U.S. GAAP, an adverse event must be
probable and estimable.' 6 Thus, if the company incurs losses
or low profits in the future, it may then release its reserves into
current income in a manner that masks such losses.'67
In the case of Daimler-Benz, sales plummeted in 1993.
Daimler-Benz released DM1.5 billion into income from hidden
reserves.6  Despite significant losses, the company reported a
profit for the first quarter of 1993 of DM200 million.'69 For the
same period under U.S. GAAP, the company reported a loss of
DM 1 billion. 7 °
The SEC is aware of the need to achieve a balance between
the principle of disclosure and the desire to attract foreign capi-
tal to U.S. shores. As past and present SEC Commissioners have
echoed, the SEC is committed to attracting "foreign issuers to
the regulated U.S. markets," as well as strengthening "interna-
tional regulatory standards and cooperation."' 7' The SEC has
shown a willingness to work closely with foreign issuers in order
to facilitate their transition into the U.S. securities market.
72
162. Id. at S85.
163. Seligman, supra note 15, at 696.
164. Breeden, supra note 18, at S85.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at S91.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Breeden noted, "interestingly, the announcement by Daimler-Benz that it
was going to reconcile its financial statements to U.S. GAAP seems to have caused
its stock to rise in comparison with other German companies, providing an interest-
ing demonstration of the value the market places on openness and transparency." Id.
171. Levitt, supra note 63.
172. In terms of dealing with the SEC, a Fletcher Challenger Limited represen-
tative indicated that the experience was "very pleasant." He added that "[tihe SEC
was always helpful, always trying to assist us through the problems. As uncompro-
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In addition, the SEC has instituted or proposed a number of rule
changes which have lessened the disclosure burden on foreign
companies. However, the SEC still maintains a fundamental
commitment to the integrity of the market as a means of pro-
viding the investor with the highest possible quality of informa-
tion.173 Despite these rule changes, the Commission still con-
siders the disclosure system essential to U.S. strategy to offer in-
vestors the highest quality product worldwide.
174
Former SEC Commissioner Breeden indicated that the
SEC's requirements for making full disclosure and providing a
"reconciliation" to U.S. GAAP are designed to achieve several
fundamental objectives.1"5 First, requirements avoid a bias
against U.S. companies in their home market.7 ' Second, the
SEC seeks to provide investors with the tools necessary to ratio-
nally compare companies. Specifically, full disclosure enables
investors to make meaningful comparisons between United
States companies and foreign firms."' Third, the SEC ap-
proach is geared toward creating a transparent market.'
7
Commentators generally agree that the recent rule changes
either implemented or proposed by the SEC have eroded the
impact of the disclosure system on the securities market. The
SEC has made a number of proposals and adopted a variety of
rule changes in order to make the U.S. regulatory environment
less daunting to foreign issuers. These changes are significant in
terms of both basic disclosure requirements and the policy of
reconciling financial statements to U.S. GAAP.
In making several changes to the accounting rules, the SEC
announced that it would propose acceptance of cash flow state-
mising as SEC standards are, the SEC staff was always seeking to help us through
the process to find a solution that was workable." Warbrick, supra note 69, at S118.
173. See generally Seligman, supra note 15.
174. Id. at S90.
175. Breeden, supra note 18, at S88. When foreign issuers make public offerings
of securities to U.S. retail investors, the commission requires that the issuers pro-
vide the same disclosures that are required of U.S. issuers. This includes reconcilia-
tion with U.S. GAAP of the issuer's equity and net income as shown in its financial
statements prepared using the issuer's home country's accounting principles. See
generally Doty, supra note 117, at 88.
176. Breeden, supra note 18.
177. Id. at S88-89. If the SEC were to adopt a system of home country exemp-
tions, then U.S. investors would be confronted with financial statements prepared
under at least forty different sets of accounting principles. Id.
178. Id.
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ments prepared in accordance with International Accounting
Standards for foreign issuers.7 9 The Commission also proposed
that first time foreign registrants provide reconciliation to U.S.
GAAP of select information and the audited financial statements
for only two years, instead of three.5 0 It extended case-by-case
waivers to foreign companies with respect to the reconciliation of
select information. 8' Additionally, the SEC proposed to elimi-
nate the requirement to reconcile financial statements of signifi-
cant acquirees and investees.'82 Moreover, the Commission
eliminated the need for reconciliation of financial statements
with respect to investment grade preferred stock." Finally,
inflation adjustments are no longer required for foreign
issuers.'"
The Commission has also suggested changes to the registra-
tion process. The SEC focused on initiatives to streamline the
eligibility criteria for short form registration for foreign issu-
ers."s It also expanded the access of foreign issuers to
unallocated shelf registration, which permits the issuer to reg-
ister securities without designating specific share amounts for
each class.' 6 Additionally, foreign issuers may use, in their
registration statements, financial statements that are ten
months old,'87 providing foreign issuers, if they meet certain
requirements," uninterrupted access to U.S. markets on stale
179. Richard Kosnik, The Role of the SEC in Evaluating Foreign Issuers Coming
to U.S. Markets, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S97, S104 (1994) (referring to International
Accounting Standard No. 7).
180. Id.
181. Id. at S105. The SEC recognizes that first time foreign issuers have a very
difficult time in reviewing historical information as a means to reconcile financial
statements. Id.
182. Id. The SEC recognizes that, in some situations, it is very difficult for a
company that does not have control of the acquiree to obtain financial information
on a timely basis. Id.
183. Id. The SEC's current position is that investment-grade preferred securities
should be treated like debt. rd.
184. Form F-20, Item 18 (c)(3)(iii) (exempting foreign issuer from reconciling
inflation adjustments). The Commission recognizes that during periods of inflation,
unadjusted historic financial cost statements show illusory profits and capital erosion
is masked. Kosnik, supra note 179, at S104.
185. Kosnik, supra note 179, at S103.
186. Id. at S104.
187. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-19(b), (c) (1996).
188. Foreign issuers must either produce their annual reports within four
months of the end of their fiscal year or provide unaudited financial statements for
one interim period in addition to their semi-annual interim reports. 17 C.F.R. §
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disclosures as compared to U.S. counterparts. 8 ' Finally, the
Commission proposed two changes to existing safe harbor rules.
Proposed Rule 135c provides foreign issuers a safe harbor for an-
nouncements in the context of contemplated unregistered offer-
ings."90 The Commission also expanded the existing Rule
139191 safe harbor relating to broker dealer research reports to
cover foreign offerings."9 2
The New York Stock Exchange appears to be the most vocal
U.S. institution calling for fundamental changes in U.S. reliance
on the disclosure system. The NYSE argues that the U.S. should
"continue or accelerate the SEC's ad hoc accommodation of for-
eign issuers on a case-by-case basis and relax the standards for
what can pass as 'equivalent to' U.S. GAAP.' 3 The NYSE
goes even further than the SEC proposals by suggesting mutual
recognition of national accounting and disclosure statements,
with some agreed-upon minimum standard or, in the alterna-
tive, recognition of International Accounting Standards.'
James L. Cochrane notes that over 2000 foreign companies
would be eligible to list on the NYSE were it not for SEC regula-
tions requiring U.S. GAAP reconciliation.'95
The NYSE argues that there is a lot of flexibility and room
to maneuver within U.S. GAAP, even for domestic compa-
220(0 (1996).
189. Kosnik, supra note 179, at S102-03.
190. Id. at S104. Proposed Rule 135c tracks the existing Rule 135, 17 C.F.R. §
230.135 (1996), with the added requirement that the announcement cannot be made
for the purpose of conditioning the U.S. market. Kosnik, supra note 179, at S106.
The SEC proposed this change because foreign issuers were often faced with" a di-
lemma. Id. In cross-border offerings, issuers have conducted Rule 144A offerings
using a public-styled distribution in order to access a large pool of institutional buy-
ers. Id. Occasionally, the issuer simultaneously undertook a Regulation S offering
offshore (with the attendant dissemination of information to potential investors). Id.
The two rules conflicted. Id.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 230.139 (1996).
192. Kosnik, supra note 179, at S106-07. Under the existing rule, broker dealers
that participate in distributions can distribute information about eligible F-3 issuers
fairly easily, 17 C.F.R. § 230.139 (1996). See Kosnik, supra note 179, at S107. The
difficulty arose when large foreign issuers came to the U.S. market for the first
time. Id. Although the foreign issuer met all of the size requirements, it did not
have a reporting history in the United States and, as a result, was denied the safe
harbor benefits. The proposed rule removes the reporting requirement if the issuer
has traded offshore for at least twelve months. Id. at S107.
193. Cochrane, supra note 18, at S64-65.
194. Id. at S65.
195. Id.
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nies. 1' Further, there is a danger that reconciling foreign ac-
counting data to U.S. GAAP will often convey an illusion of
comparability that does not exist.197 The NYSE claims that "in
order to understand a foreign company's financial position, one
must ultimately come to terms with the home country's legal
and regulatory environment as well as it's accounting stan-
dards."9 s
In addition, the New York Stock Exchange adds, retail in-
vestors are not protected by current SEC policy, which compels
the securities of world-class foreign companies that have not
reconciled to U.S. GAAP to trade on the over-the-counter elec-
tronic bulletin board where no financial information is made
available to investors at all.' In contrast, Cochrane notes that
U.S. companies currently issue shares in most major foreign
markets without having to conform to foreign financial disclo-
sure or accounting rules."°
Proponents of the disclosure regime focus primarily on the
value of maintaining trust and confidence in the U.S. market.
The proponents of this position, while somewhat discordant as to
the changes that have already taken place, clearly agree that
further adjustments are undesirable. While U.S. markets have
strong competition from secondary trading markets, the U.S. has
a dramatic competitive edge in primary offerings.2°' This is sig-
nificant in that securities markets are now the only real source
of capital.2"2 Proponents of the disclosure model believe that
maintenance of the U.S. system is necessary to ensure U.S.
competitiveness.
The acceptance of complete disclosure is growing in foreign
markets. For instance, regulators from Latin America, Canada,
and the United States recently embraced disclosure principles as
196. Id. at S61-66. For example, Exxon and IBM both use U.S. GAAP, but look-
ing at Exxon financial and IBM financial in a line-by-line comparison, is not compar-
ing "apples to apples." Id. at S66.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at S62.
200. Id. at S63.
201. See generally Seligman, supra note 15.
202. Breeden, supra note 18, at S80. Lenders increasingly channel credit through
open capital markets rather than through an intermediate credit channel. Id. The
last "commercial and industrial" or "C&I" (corporate nonreal estate) loan in the U.S.
was made in early 1989. Id.
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essential to the integration of American markets.2 3 In fact,
foreign issuers are increasingly recognizing that complete disclo-
sure, specifically the U.S. disclosure regime, enhances share
value.
Foreign issuers that have converted to U.S. GAAP can pro-
vide interesting lessons. As noted, the Daimler-Benz study sug-
gests that the market will place a premium on large companies
that disclose, despite temporary downturns. A New Zealand
company, Fletcher Challenger Limited, embraced U.S. GAAP,
not simply as a means of entering the U.S. market, but as an
attempt to make itself more attractive in its own markets and
around the world.20' As a Fletcher representative noted,
"[t]here were just too many equity securities being offered
around the world these days for people not to be able to under-
stand and trust your financial statements and your presenta-
tions easily. U.S. GAAP gave us that credibility in presenta-
tion."2"5
Criticism of the SEC for its focus on the admission of cer-
tain foreign issuers to U.S. markets, rather than pursuing a
policy of integration, is justified to some degree. The Commis-
sion has taken a middle of the road position by insisting on U.S.
disclosure, yet at the same time creating exceptions for foreign
issuers on an ad hoc basis. This policy, while successful in open-
ing U.S. securities markets to new participants, has in effect
203. In June 1994, the Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas
(COSRA) endorsed a resolution calling for a uniform system of mandatory disclosure
in the hemisphere, see Levitt, supra note 63, and recently reviewed the supervision
of derivatives trading and markets in each of the participating countries in an effort
to foster market transparency. See Mary L. Schapiro, Investment Risks: Full Disclo-
sure Protects Investors and Expands Markets, Latin Derivatives 1996, LATIN FIN.,
Jan. 1996, at D2.
204. Warbrick, supra note 69. Fletcher's story provides an interesting example.
Id. The New Zealand market appeared unable to recover from the financial crisis
resulting from the stock market crash of October 1987. Id. at S113. This crisis deep-
ened with the failure of certain large New Zealand companies and was exacerbated
by a lack of trust and confidence in New Zealand regulatory and accounting stan-
dards. Id. Fletcher decided that the only way they could solidify investor confidence
in their home market was to adopt U.S. GAAP. Id. Fletcher also felt that a switch
to U.S. GAAP was essential in order to ensure successful securities offerings in Asia.
Id. In this vein, Fletcher pursued an initial strategy that involved doing a registra-
tion without a public offering. Id. at S115. This strategy simplified the process by
removing investment banker input from the picture. Id. This approach also avoided
the market-imposed time pressures associated with public offerings. Id. at S115.
205. Id.
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created two tiers of securities regulation. This is problematic
given the SEC's consistent and vocal commitment to the disclo-
sure system in place. While this approach has garnered wide
praise, the policy does not adequately address the future of a
stable, uniform, and truly integrated international or hemispher-
ic securities market.
The Commission, however, has taken some steps to create
widespread agreement on international accounting standards as
an alternative to U.S. GAAP. As noted, the SEC is interested in
working with the International Accounting Standards Commit-
tee in establishing "core standards" for cross-border offerings
and listings.2" In fact, a number of experts believe that given
the recent rise in world-wide investment and cross-boarder trad-
ing, globally recognized, high quality accounting standards are
essential or "investors' interest and capital markets will suffer
"207
While the accounting issues are clearly important to market
integration, acceptance of international standards will not alone
usher in a new era of global securities trading. As SEC Commis-
sioner Wallman noted, the debate "too often focuses on whether
the U.S. should lower its accounting standards or the interna-
tional community should raise its standards."2 "8 Wallman add-
ed that the important question is whether the standards fairly
depict the company's financial standing.2"
206. id; see also Bureau of National Affairs, International Accounting: Need for
International Rules Voiced by IASC Chief, FASB Member, BNA SECURITIES DAILY
(May 20, 1996) "The SEC, as a member of IOSCO, will insist that the core stan-
dards 'be of high quality' and 'must be rigorously interpreted and applied .... "Id.
In addition, the SEC has conditioned acceptance of international standards on three
"key" elements: (1) the "core" standards must constitute a comprehensive, generally
accepted basis for accounting; (2) the standards must provide full disclosure and, in
addition, must result in both transparency and comparability; and, as noted, (3) they
"must be rigorously interpreted and applied .... '"SEC Statement Regarding Inter-
national Accounting Standards, SEC NEWS DIGEST, Issue 96-67, available in LEXIS,
Fedsec file, 1996 SEC News, LEXIS 873) (April 11, 1996). The Commission has al-
ready accepted some international standards. For instance, the Commission, as part
of the rule changes noted, now permits foreign issuers to use International Account-
ing Standard No. 7 in preparing cash flow statements. Warbrick, supra note 69.
207. Bureau of National Affairs, supra note 206.
208. See Federal Securities and Corporate Developments, 28 SEC. REG. & L. REP.





Chairman Wallman believes that the United States must
have a more comprehensive view of securities regulation in light
of the changing technology and globalization of markets.210
This approach requires a greater understanding and focus on
the international economic environment. 211 This philosophy,
Wallman indicated, should focus on macro or goal oriented poli-
cies rather than "'dictating'. .. substantive regulatory standards
for specific problems."212
V. "OFFSHORE" EXCHANGE
The various proposals for a "limited" or "offshore" market
rely on the belief that the creation of a traditional exchange is
unrealistic. This view considers disclosure obligations as a formi-
dable barrier and sees Miami as a major capital market only if
its focus is limited.213 Rather than view the market as a contin-
uum from private to public transactions, this approach concen-
trates on technical, specialized transactions which dominate the
private market."4 The "offshore" proposal has met with "luke-
warm interest by [local] business executives .... ,,25
The strategy of the proponents of the "offshore" exchange is
two-fold. First, it attracts developing market firms to the United
States through available exceptions to the registration pro-
cess.2"6 Second, it creates a special market, with access limited
to non-U.S. nationals and institutional investors, that permits
companies to seek capital without application of federal and
state restrictions. 7 Supporters of this strategy seek enabling
legislation to create a basic minimum regulatory and license
approval process for investment advisors and broker/dealers to
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. Commissioner Wallman outlined a suggested four part plan: (1) under-
stand the typically economic facts that effect the market place; (2) evaluate how
market behavior impacts market participants; (3) determine whether the proposed
regulation addresses the underlying economic causes or simply provides a short term
solution; and (4) permit goal-oriented, regulatory flexibility in administering the rule.
Id.
213. Whisenand, supra note 3.
214. Id.
215. Julie Vorman, Miami Eyes Role as Wall Street for Latin America, REUTERS,
Dec. 7, 1995.
216. Whisenand, supra note 3.
217. Id.
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underwrite issues.21 This market would function as an elec-
tronic exchange with the status of a self-regulatory organiza-
tion.219 The exchange, which will be known as the "Electronic
Latin American Exchange," will be owned by the regional Latin
American stock exchanges.22 °
Sections 3(b) and 4(2) of the Securities Act provide exemp-
tions from registration for limited and nonpublic offerings. Do-
mestic issuers generally use Regulation D22 to comply with
these exemptions.222 Private placements by foreign issuers are
primarily conducted through the structure provided under Rule
144A.22 3 Rule 144A is intended to make the private placement
alternative more attractive by making it easier for shares to be
traded within a two-year restricted period.22" Rule 144A offer-
ings are made solely to Qualified Institutional Buyers.2" The
criteria for that designation is rather strict and is only satisfied
by very large institutions.226 Registration with the SEC is not
required,227 and the foreign firm may distribute financial
statements in accordance with its home country's accounting
principles.22 In addition, transferability of securities is greatly
simplified.229
The Rule 144A process may suggest that foreign firms are
not as concerned with the cost or burden of disclosure as they
are with the disclosure of sensitive information. For instance,
institutional investors require specific financial information that
is consistent with requirements under the registration process.
As a result, the offering memorandum almost invariably in-
cludes a narrative description of the differences between the
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Vorman, supra note 215.
221. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-50 (1995).
222. Mostoff, supra note 106, at 351-52. Although the "safe harbor" aspects of
Regulation D make it the most commonly relied on exemption for private placements
and limited offerings, an issuer may also prefer to rely on judicial and administra-
tive rulings construing section 4(2). Id. at 352.
223. Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1995).
224. Decker, supra note 64, at S14.
225. Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1995).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.; see also Decker, supra note 64, at S14.
229. Jensen, supra note 93, at 837. In order to transfer a security under the old
private placement procedure, in virtually every case an opinion of counsel had to be
delivered. This was a huge impediment to liquidity. Id.
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home country's accounting principles and generally accepted
accounting principles. 20 Additionally, investment bankers re-
quire a fair amount of financial detail.231 As a result, at least
one commentator has suggested that Rule 144A transactions are
not that much different from a public offering in terms of effort
and cost.
232
While foreign participation in the private placement market
initially increased after the adoption of Rule 144A, the last two
years have seen a decrease in such offerings by foreign issu-
ers.2" Companies are learning that if they really want to take
advantage of U.S. markets, they must make a public
offering.2' The SEC has taken steps to enhance the attractive-
ness of the private placement option. For instance, a revised reg-
istration and reporting process permits access to PORTAL, the
National Association of Securities Dealers' secondary trading
system for unregistered securities. 2' As Cesar Alvarez notes,
"[a] significant number of foreign equity securities not publicly
traded in other U.S. markets have also entered the PORTAL
market, since in many cases these securities are perceived to be
of better quality than U.S. over-the-counter securities .... 3
In addition to the various methods of offering securities in
the United States, foreign and U.S. issuers may take advantage
of Regulation S, an exemption that permits the sale of unregis-
tered securities that come to rest offshore. 237 The placement of
securities technically in compliance with Regulation S, but
which in reality are attempts to evade the registration require-
ments, will not receive the benefit of the safe harbor s.2  The
230. Decker, supra note 64, at S17.
231. Id.
232. Id. at S15.
233. Kosnik, supra note 179, at S99-100 (1994).
234. See Velli, supra note 66, at S54. While the private placement market was
substantial in 1991 and 1992, the market died in 1993. Id. In 1992, about $3.8
billion was raised in equity under 144A ADR offerings. In 1994 it was estimated to
drop to $500 million. Id.
235. See Cesar L. Alvarez, Global Markets; Latin America, LATIN SEC. LAWS
1994, July 1994, at Sll. PORTAL is a computerized trading system for restricted se-
curities sold to institutional investors in reliance on Rule 144A Id. PORTAL may be
used for securities that have been placed in an offshore distribution. Id.
236. Id.
237. Regulation S provides that § 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e),
shall not apply to offers or sales of securities outside the United States.
238. SEC Interpretive Release No. 33-7190, 17 C.F.R. § 231.
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temporary offshore placement of securities where the incidence
of ownership never leaves the U.S. violates the rule."9 Fur-
thermore, where the economic risk never leaves the U.S. during
the restricted period, or where there is no reasonable expecta-
tion that the securities "came to rest" abroad, would not come
within the rule.2"
Cross-border tender and exchange offers, however, raise
problems for the bidder or issuer under the federal securities
laws, despite special exceptions.241 As a result, U.S. sharehold-
ers have been traditionally excluded from such transactions.242
For instance, LBT acquisitions, in their tender offer for Labatt's
stock, expressly excluded U.S. shareholders from the tender offer
where, despite Labatt's exemption under Rule 12g3-2(b), 2" the
offer would not comply with Regulation S.2" This exclusion
threatens the ability of the U.S. shareholder from realizing the
value of his investment in the absence of protection extended by
the home country. 2' However, the SEC and the courts have
shown some flexibility in the application of the securities laws to
tender and exchange offers.2 For instance, through a liberal
reading of Regulation S, the SEC has embraced a policy that
encourages inclusion of U.S. investors in such transactions.247
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Smith, supra note 60.
242. Id.
243. Labatt is a foreign private issuer in which U.S. residents own approximate-
ly twelve percent of its shares. See John Labatt, Ltd. v. LBT Acquisition Corp., 890
F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Labatt opted under the Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 12g3-2(b) to furnish the SEC with certain information including
disclosures and filings that it is required to make under Canadian law and stock
exchange rules. Id. By doing so, it is exempt from registration under Section 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
244. See id.
245. Id. In Labatt, a second step transaction occurs in which the shareholders
who have not tendered are bought out at substantially the same consideration. Id.
at 239.
246. Interestingly, one of the issue in Labatt was the role of press coverage in
casting a foreign tender offer as an offer under federal law. Id. The court noted that
"[niothing in the U.S. securities laws requires a foreign tender offeror to exclude
U.S. press coverage in order to avoid U.S. regulation of its foreign offer .... Where
a foreign bidder has steadfastly avoided American channels in its pursuit of a for-
eign target, the American interest in extensive disclosure appears minimal. Where
the only acts within the United States are second hand news accounts not directly
attributable to the bidder, the American contact which would justify .. .jurisdiction
is relatively small and counsels against its use." Id. at 245-46.
247. See Smith, supra note 60. But cf. Securities and Exchange Commission v.
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The U.S. exchange and trading regulations are designed to
protect investors purchasing securities from paying an artificial-
ly inflated price.2" Of particular concern is an offering by a
foreign issuer in the United States, where the principal market
making activities are in that issuer's home market.249 Trading
rules prohibit transactions by foreign distribution participants,
including affiliates, during a distribution in the United
States.2 0 Because the primary market maker in the foreign
market is the underwriter, and since the underwriter will not
withdraw from the market, strict application of the trading rules
would prohibit a distribution in the U.S. that is simultaneous
with a foreign global offering."' Here too, the SEC has adopted
a flexible approach that exempts issuers conditioned on certain
disclosures and record keeping rules.252
The main thrust of the "offshore" approach is to establish
Miami as a significant capital market.25 This proposal de-em-
phasizes U.S.-Latin American integration. The plan endeavors to
match Miami's strategic position as a gateway to the Southern
Hemisphere with the specialized skill and resources that drive
private capital markets.25 As James Whisenand notes in his
working paper on the subject, the objectives encompass enhanc-
ing Miami's existing international investment banking and capi-
tal markets;2" establishing Miami as the "hub" for Latin
American and Caribbean markets; passing enabling legislation
for an offshore capital market "free zone;" and attracting a rea-
sonable number of private placements and public offerings for
transactions in the range of one to forty million dollars.2"6
This approach, while sensible as a first step on the path to a
complete market, is troubling for two reasons. First, private
placements of securities have declined in recent years and ex-
Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) (indicating that exemptions to the 1933
Act are construed narrowly).





253. Whisenand, supra note 3.
254. See id.
255. Id. Between 1978 and the mid-1980s, Florida became the second largest
international commercial banking center and the second largest foreign deposit cen-
ter in the United States. Id.
256. Id.
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perts believe that this trend will continue.257 Second, this pro-
posal arguably emphasizes a specialized market for professional
expertise, rather than a primary market for capital. This aspect
poses practical difficulties; some experts question whether Mi-
ami can compete for the professional and legal expertise neces-
sary to sustain such a venture.2s
VI. INFORMATIONAL EXCHANGE
The concept of an information exchange, or electronic bulle-
tin board, appears to offer the most promise for centering a
capital market in Miami in the near future.29 This proposal,
known as "Cyberport Miami" has broad support in the Miami
257. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. However, while private place-
ments have decreased, evidence suggests that ADR programs associated with private
placements have increased. ADR programs are classified according to the level of the
sponsoring company's activity in the U.S. market and generally track the method by
which the foreign firm has entered the market: Level I tracks private placement,
Level II follows an exchange listing, and Level III covers the public sale of securi-
ties. The vast majority of companies that come into the U.S. market start off with a
Level I ADR program and then upgrade over time. Velli, supra note 66, at S44. The
number of Level I ADR programs have dramatically increased in recent years. Id. at
S43. Some foreign companies view the Level I program as a cost-effective means to
start building a core group of U.S. investors. Id. at S44. According to one industry
expert, a Level I company can expect to obtain three to six percent of its sharehold-
er base in the United States; an upgrade to Level II or III will materially increase
the investor base ten to fifteen percent on average. Id. at S45. A Level I ADR
trades over-the-counter in the U.S. on the pink sheets and is established through an
information exemption under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Act of
1933, U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1981); see Velli supra note 66, at S43-44. In order to quali-
fy for a Level I ADR, all a foreign company has to do is supply the SEC with the
material information they produce and distribute in their home country. Id. at S44.
Registration is not required. Id. Since the company is not registered, a Level I ADR
cannot be listed on an exchange and cannot be used to raise capital. Id. A foreign
company reaches Level II when it lists on one of the U.S. exchanges.
Level II ADR listings are also on the rise. Id. at S48. The rapid pick-up in
listings is attributable, in part, to the fact that many companies that established
Level I programs two or three years ago had a very favorable experience in the U.S.
marketplace and are now upgrading to a listing on an exchange. Id. Experts attrib-
ute the increase in Level II offerings to the wave of privatization that are occurring
throughout the world. Id.
258. Note that Mr. Whisenand's comment, which sees a full-service exchange as
simply repeating the New York Stock Exchange, supra note 74, may have some
application to an "offshore" market as well to the degree that other legal markets
presently service private placements.
259. Supporters believe that Cyberport, which requires approximately "$3 million
in computer equipment and half a dozen employees, would be relatively quick and
easy to set up." Johnson, supra note 72.
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legal community and is backed by the Florida Department of
Commerce.26 ° Cyberport provides "a single point of access to
accurate and timely information [for Latin American and Carib-
bean securities] which can be sold to value-added re-sellers
worldwide."26' The concept is not wholly unique. Competition is
posed by other information providers, and arguably, by the ex-
panded international access provided by the Internet.26 2 In
fact, a great deal of international investment information is
available via the Internet.2" Although there appears to be no
service that provides all relevant investment and securities
information on a global basis, it is now possible to access invest-
ment summaries, broker reports, company profiles, company
annual reports, daily market indices and even quotes at will.2 4
260. Julie Vorman, Miami Eyes Role as Wall Street for Latin America, REUTERS,
LTD., Dec. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Current File.
261. CYBERPORT MIAMI, supra note 4.
262. First Call, the electronic vendor of Wall Street research, is expanding its
franchise into emerging markets. Galant, supra note 136, at 79. In Latin America it
has initiated coverage of Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and
Brazil. Id.
263. See Lenape Investment Corp., Favorite Links, available on the internet at
http://www.voicenet.com/-rsauers. html (listing global financial data services).
264. See id. (Austrian Stock exchange offering daily market summary and listed
company directory; Bolsa Nacional de Valores, S.A. providing directory of listed com-
panies on Costa Rica's stock exchange; Canada Newswire furnishing daily news re-
leases from participating companies; Canada Stockwatch producing corporate profiles,
charts and quotes; Chamber of Mines of South Africa giving industry based informa-
tion including market indices; Cyberplex Interactive Media offering information on
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, including the opportunity to order
annual reports online; Die Welt Online providing daily German stock prices; Digital
Link furnishing profiles and contact information for companies listed on the Vancou-
ver Stock Exchange; Geneva Stock Exchange supplying daily stock and bond summa-
ries; Globes Publishers Ltd. providing quotes for companies listed on the Tel Aviv
Stock Exchange; Institute of Commercial Engineering offering Russian securities
market news including charts and data files; Italian Stock exchange giving market
indices and share price charts; Ljublijana Stock Exchange offering information re-
garding Slovinia's stock exchange, including daily quote summaries; London Inter-
national Financial Futures & Options Exchanges producing current and historical
quotes as well as trade specifications; Madrid Stock Exchange providing market
indices and statistics, company information and quotes of main companies; MAHA
Internet Service Inc. supplying daily market indices and the leading share prices on
the Korean Stock Exchange; Malaysia Online furnishing market indices, quotes and
summaries for the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange; Nagoya Stock Exchange offering
stock and convertible bond quotes; National Computer Board giving market indices,
gainers and losers, and quotes for the Singapore Stock Exchange; Network Informa-
tion Services providing market indices and unit trust prices for the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange; South African Futures Exchange offering historical and current
prices and trade specifications; STAT Publishing producing market price updates
from the Winnipeg Commodities Exchange; Telenium giving end-day quotes for all
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Cyberport, however, attempts specialization and regional coordi-
nation to a degree that does not presently exist.
Proponents argue that Cyberport will significantly increase
the flow of capital to hemispheric markets by linking these mar-
kets together.2" Organizers contend that a "high-tech bulletin
board in Miami would help inject new liquidity into the Caribbe-
an and Latin American stock exchanges.""' Trading activity
data would be easier to obtain, presented in a uniform format,
and could help harmonize the region's trading practices.6 7
Florida's Secretary of Commerce, Charles Dusseau, estimated
that Cyberport Miami could attract billions of dollars to existing
Latin American markets.2" Under the present plan, similar to
the "offshore" proposal, Cyberport would be collectively owned by
the regional market organizations.6 9
Cyberport Miami, will serve as a service bureau rendering
assistance "where 'inter-connectivity' and 'centralized
distribution' of data is desired."27 Exchanges will use it to sell
their data on a nonexclusive basis.271 The type of information
that Cyberport expects to gather and then disseminate includes
broker research reports and company specific information, in-
cluding annual reports and price quotes.272 There is an expec-
tation that this system will ultimately assist in the settlement of
trades on a global basis.27 Other proposals suggest that trade-
matching is also feasible.274 In fact, supporters view Cyberport
Canadian regional exchanges; Teleserv online Stock Information producing quotes for
German stocks; Tokyo Grain Exchange furnishing contact specifications, charts and
quotes; University of Vienna supplying quotes for the Vienna Stock Exchange; Van-
couver Stock exchange providing a directory of North American venture capital firms
and company profiles and statistics; and Zagreb Stock Exchange supplying directories
and quote summaries for Croatian companies).
265. Galant, supra note 136.
266. Vorman, supra note 260.
267. Id.
268. Charles Lunan, Network Could Boost Latin American Stocks, State Compli-
ance Chief Backs Computerized Trading System in Miami, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Laud-
erdale), Dec. 6, 1995, at Dl.




273. Id. Cyberport will not compete with settlement banks, but will serve as a
hub for trade information, facilitating settlement at less cost. Id.
274. Facsimile from the office of Charles Dusseau, Florida Secretary of Com-
merce (Nov. 28, 1995) (on file with U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.). An earlier version
of this proposal envisioned an electronic medium that served as a high tech service
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as an "incremental step towards the establishment of a complete
exchange."275
Cyberport directs investors to a foreign company's home
market. 27' Further, it is claimed that this greater distribution
of data will result in "broader investor populations, greater li-
quidity, and more transparency of initial and secondary trading"
which will enhance privatization efforts in Latin America.2 "
Finally, such an approach, supporters argue, creates incentives
to provide a uniform capital market structure throughout the re-
gion.
2 78
Backers of the proposal generally do not believe that federal
securities laws prohibit the implementation of Cyberport Mi-
ami.279 Secretary Dusseau noted that an information exchange
would not require SEC approval because the exchange would be
selling information, not stocks.2 ° While this may be an
overstatement, a preliminary analysis indicates that the federal
rules governing securities exchanges do not apply to centralized
information providers. 81 Commission letter rulings under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940,252 to some extent, support
this position.283
bureau for settlement of Latin American Securities and/or as a center for posting
and processing trades. Id. This proposal rejected the notion that servicing trades
resulted in exchange status. Id. As one report emphasized, Cyberport is a service
bureau, not an exchange. Id. Thus, regional exchanges are the customers, while
Cyberport simply facilitates transactions. Id. There is some basis for this logic. The
SEC regards proprietary trading systems as nonexchanges because they match rather
than execute trades. Solomon and Corso note that "[t]he customer, not the system,
directs the execution [of the trade]." Solomon & Corso, supra note 76, at 321. Note
that while trade matching has been suggested, Cyberport no longer incorporates
trade matching. CYBERPORT MIAMI, supra note 4.
275. Johnson, supra note 72.
276. CYBERPORT MIAMI, supra note 4.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Informally, organizers presented the Cyberport proposal to the Director of
Market Regulation at the Securities Exchange Commission. Telephone Interview with
Carlos Loumiet, securities attorney involved in Cyberport proposal, April, 1996.
280. Mickie Valente, Investors Who Buy Latin Will Like This, TAMPA TRIBUNE,
Dec. 9, 1995, at Business & Finance 1.
281. CYBERPORT MIAMI, supra note 4.
282. 15 U.S.C. § 81b-6.
283. See DATASTREAM INT'L, INC., INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, §
202(a)(11), No-Action Letter No. 93-33-CC (Mar. 15, 1993) (indicating that entities
which primarily collect and disseminate financial information over electronic media
are not usually regulated as an exchange).
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This position does not, however, address the registration
and disclosure requirements of federal securities law. While
electronic access to financial information is now commonplace,
there is no existing service for the express purpose of attracting
capital to a specific developing region and, arguably, to promote
the companies based there. The stated purpose of Cyberport
Miami is to support integration of the capital markets of the
hemisphere and to attract U.S. dollars to existing Caribbean and
Latin American stock exchanges.2" To the extent that compa-
nies from these markets are not registered within the United
States or have not availed themselves of applicable safe harbors,
a question arises as to whether the dissemination of financial
information constitutes an "offer.""' If, in fact, the Commission
considers the distribution of information in such a context an of-
fer, then the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933 are directly at odds with such a proposal.
Section 2(3) of the Securities Act provides that the term
"offer to sell," "offer for sale," or "offer" shall include "every at-
tempt to offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a
security or an interest in a security for value."2 The SEC has
interpreted "offer" broadly and various courts have accepted this
construction.287 In fact, "offer" has been interpreted to include
any communication which is designed to procure orders for a
security.2" In short, any communication which conditions the
market may be construed as an offer. Using an oft-quoted pas-
sage, the Commission explained:
It apparently is not generally understood, however, that
the publication of public information and statements, and
publicity efforts, generally made in advance of a proposed fi-
nancing, although not couched in terms of an express offer,
284. Lunan, supra note 268.
285. Classification of an international communication as an "offer" may raise
additional questions regrading the ability of the SEC to monitor or regulate foreign
markets and their market participants. See Canada NewsWire, The Upper Canada
Brewing Company Announces Initial Public Offering, available on the Internet at
http'//www.newswire.ca/releases/February 1996/09/C2596.html (indicating that news
release announcing an initial public offering in Canada, easily accessed in the Unit-
ed States via the Internet, was "not for distribution in the United States").
286. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3).
287. Securities Exchange Commission v. Liberty Petroleum Corp., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 9 93,209.
288. Id.
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may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or
arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of
an issuer in a manner which raises a serious question wheth-
er the publicity is not in fact part of the selling effort." g
Of course construction may vary with the nature of the
financing or the identity of the market participants. This sug-
gests a fluid dichotomy, but one that creates doubt when the
identity of the participants is unclear or where the financing is
particularly sensitive.29 ° Thus, where there is a lack of so-
phistication on the part of the target's investing public, or the
investment is particularly risky, or the originating market raises
concerns for the Commission, the release of information may
approach an offer. The dichotomy is not itself unreasonable even
factoring in the element of unpredictability, however, such a
shift often occurs as policy objectives change, not simply with a
transformation of philosophy. Where the integration of diverse
markets is concerned, such a fluid and uncertain process indi-
cates a foundational defect.29'
289. J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Stephen M. DeTore, Rationalizing the Disclosure
Process: The Summary Annual Report, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 39, 92 (citing Publi-
cation of Information Prior to or After Effective Date of Registration Statement, Sec.
Act Rel. No. 3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 3250 (Oct. 8, 1957).
290. See Solomon & Corso, supra note 76 (discussing the meaning of the term
"facility" in defining "exchange," and the contention that the definition has the po-
tential to change depending on status).
291. Consider that the SEC recently indicated that the '[e]xperience with Regu-
lation A . . . 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-263, suggests that the 'test the waters' initiative
provides issuers of small offerings a useful and cost-effective means of assessing
whether there is sufficient potential interest in the investment to proceed with an
offering." Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, Sec. Act Rel. No.
33-7188, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,648 (June 27, 1995). As a result, the Commission proposed
a rule change which extends the "test the waters" approach to Initial Public Offer-
ings (IPOs). See id. (outlining proposed Rule 135d). This rule permits the solicitation
of interest prior to the filing of a registration statement. Id.
Certain types of issuers are excluded from this safe harbor. Excluded issuers
include issuers of asset-backed securities, partnerships, limited liability companies,
and other direct participation investment programs, investment companies, and blank
check and penny stock issuers. Id. The last group is prohibited from use of this rule
due to the substantial abuses that arise in such offerings. Id. Thus, the company
has a means of gauging investor interest before incurring the significant expense
involved in preparing IPO disclosure documents. Id.
Communications meeting the requirements of the Rule would not be deemed
an offer of a security for purposes of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. The
type of information that may be disseminated under this Rule includes the amount
of securities that will be issued, price information, and forward looking reports, in-
cluding unaudited financial statements and projections. Id. The SEC expressly per-
mits electronic dissemination of such information, including distribution via the
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It is clear that the SEC permits data services to distribute
information regarding the operation of unregistered companies.
In a no-action letter regarding Datastream International, a fi-
nancial services provider, the SEC outlined its position regard-
ing registration as an investment advisor.292 The SEC indicat-
ed that financial information providers are not investment pro-
viders if "(1) the information is readily available to the public in
its raw state, (2) the categories of the information presented are
not highly selective, and (3) the information is not organized or
presented in a manner which suggests the purchase, holding or
sale of any security or securities.""' The no-action letter indi-
cates that the Commission may decline to give no-action assur-
ance where a financial interest in the data exists; or restrictions
of the data to geographical location, business type, size, or price
range occur; or where the user is equipped to evaluate whether
to engage in certain transactions.294
These specific restrictions seem particularly significant in
light of Cyberport Miami. First, the home exchanges will collec-
tively own the service.295 This amounts to a financial interest
in the sale of securities. Second, Cyberport is established to
service an express geographical market.296 This region is cer-
tainly a large and diverse market, suggesting that this factor
may not impact the analysis to a great degree. However, it is
also true that the correlation of activity in Latin American secu-
rities markets suggests treatment as a single market for regula-
tory purposes. Third, while Cyberport does not incorporate size
Internet. Id. The fact that quotes and forward-looking financial statements are pro-
tected under this safe harbor suggests that such material, under certain facts and
circumstances, constitutes an "offer" within the meaning of the Act.
292. See DATASTREAM IN'L, INC., supra note 283. The SEC permitted
Datastream to withdraw its registration as an investment adviser. Id. Datastream
provides economic and financial information services to the securities and financial
industry world-wide, including earnings and dividends for over 30,000 companies on
a global basis. Id. Its customers are predominantely investment managers and insti-
tutional investors. Id. Datastream collects it's data from a variety of financial sourc-
es. Id. The volume of the information is extensive and without restriction. Id.
Datastream's customers select the criteria for searching the information. Id. The
analytical programs do not enable the user to manipulate the data. Id. In addition,
the company did not have a financial interest in the use of the data connected to
the sale of securities. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.




restrictions, it appears to encompass mid-range and small
firms.
2 9 7
These factors are not in themselves conclusive. Certainly
Cyberport can be organized to reduce or altogether avoid the
impact of these issues. In addition, the main thrust of the
Cyberport proposal is to sell information to information re-sell-
ers29 _ their customers are not primarily end users.
Note that this discussion centers around Cyberport's status
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.99 This is tangen-
tial to the issue of whether the dissemination of certain informa-
tion constitutes an offer, or whether Cyberport's status may be
transformed into that of a broker, dealer, or underwriter. As
noted, theoretically at least, these issues exist. While Cyberport
is primarily a data service provider, given today's technology, it
certainly has the promise to achieve its stated goal: to attract
billions of dollars to the Latin American securities market.00
That claim itself is likely enough to give the Commission pause.
The SEC's view of "informational" exchanges as outside the
scope of trading markets may exist because of the structure of
financial markets. These markets are largely organized into two
segments, a trading component and information activities. The
SEC monitors and regulates both segments. As one writer noted,
"these functions are complimentary, but their coupling in the
same agency appears to have led to a split personality in SEC
administration of the securities laws.""0' The SEC, in regard to
its disclosure role, has "warmly accepted its mandate."0 2 How-
ever, it has "generally played down, and at times has even disre-
garded and repudiated" its responsibility to regulate the trading
markets."3
To the degree that electronic media may be replacing full
service exchanges, the distinction between these two segments is
no longer clear. If relevant market information is available to
the investor, it is then relatively easy for the investor, via tele-
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 15 U.S.C. § 80b(1).
300. Lunan, supra note 268.
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phone or computer, to execute a trade on any foreign mar-
ket.3 ' This is precisely the challenge posed by an international
"informational" exchange. In effect, the information and trading
aspects of securities markets are merged.
Computers have revolutionized the way securities are trad-
ed."'5 From the coffee house exchange to the vast and prolific
electronic network that exists today, tracing the evolution of
such markets does not express the challenges presented by a
global marketplace." 6 In fact, as Joel Seligman points out,
"much of the recent history of the stock markets involves the
transaction from manual to computer transactions." 7 Comput-
ers are now essential to both the origination and execution of
trades.0 8 Furthermore, the current availability of financial in-
formation on a global basis is unprecedented.
For example, private systems presently exist in the United
States which provide real-time market information as well as
trading capabilities for institutional investors." 9 In fact, the
SEC has granted several no-action letters that permit these
systems to operate without registration as an exchange.310
304. See Charles Schwab Advertisement, Charles Schwab & Co., available on the
Internet at http'/www.latinolink.com/latino.shtml (offering Latin American and Ca-
ribbean investment and brokerage services including investment literature and real-
time quotes).
305. See Solomon & Corso, supra note 76, at 299 (discussing the impact of com-
puters on securities markets).
306. Id. at 299-300. Note the authors' historical observation regarding Baron von
Reuters use of carrier pigeons to transmit stock quotes in the 1800s. Id. at 300
(citing Marcom, Welcome to Hauppauge, the World's Next Financial Capital, FORBES,
Oct. 30, 1989, at 145).
307. Seligman, supra note 15, at 665.
308. Id. at 665-66.
309. Solomon & Corso, supra note 76, at 320.
310. Id. at 321-22 n.160 (citing Proprietary Trading Sys., Notice of Proposed
Rule-making, Release No. 34-26,708, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,429, 15,431). Under section 3(1)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1953, an exchange is any organization that pro-
vides a marketplace or facility which binds together purchasers and sellers of securi-
ties. Solomon & Corso, supra note 76, at 324 n.174 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(1)
(1988)). Solomon and Corso agree that while proprietary systems conform to the
literal definition of an exchange, they should nevertheless be exempted until they
evolve into "mature" markets. Id., at 326. However, some of the systems which fall
within the exception, as the SEC presently defines it, execute trades. The authors
note that such activities exceed the functions of a "mere broker." Id. at 327. The
SEC labels such systems as broker/dealers rather than exchanges. This approach has
a systematic problem: broker/dealer signifies status. An exchange, as defined, denotes
a facility where trades occur. In a computer driven market, there is no central,
physical location. For instance, the SEC, in a literal reading of the definition of ex-
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However, the ability to monitor and control such "exchanges"
causes concern among regulators, particularly where linkage
with foreign markets is contemplated. Authors Solomon and
Corso believe that under such circumstances the SEC would
demand a mechanism to identify violations of U.S. securities
law. 1 Presently, it appears that the Commission's position in
this regard turns on whether the system facilitates or actually
executes a trade." This distinction is less then clear.
The recent proposal by Wit Capital to create an Internet
investment bank and brokerage raises further questions regard-
ing both the potential for international securities trading and
the SEC's position regarding the use of computers in cross-bor-
der trading. Wit Trade, which recently suspended trading at the
request of the SEC to provide the Commission more time to
study their system,"'3 expects to arrange "'public offerings of
securities through the World Wide Web.' 314 In addition, this
venture plans to develop "'a digital stock exchange' for the sec-
ondary trading of securities" through the Internet.315
In a letter ruling dated March 22, 1996, the SEC apparently
has cleared the way for this system to operate with some modifi-
cations. Specifically, the SEC noted that in light of the "innova-
tive nature of the system ... interpretive relief is
appropriate .... "316 The SEC suggested modifications relating
to the use of an escrow agent to handle purchaser's funds, provi-
sion of price and volume information, with adequate record
change, has noted that such systems do not have a trading floor. Id. at 322-25,
n.160-77.
311. Id. at 323.
312. See id. at 327.
313. Stock Markets: Brewing Company Founder Cites Plans for Internet Invest-
ment Bank, Brokerage, BNA SECURITIES LAW DAILY, April 3, 1996.
314. Bureau of National Affairs, Stock Markets: Staff Clears Way for NY Concern
to Resume Stock Trading on Internet, BNA Securities Law Daily, March 27, 1996.
315. Id. "[Tihe firm's Web site will include a public offering market 'through
which the official offering documents of issuers become public . . . ." Id. "[I]nvestors
will be able to engage in securities transactions without having to use brokers or
pay commissions." Id. However, Wit Capital "expects client companies to pay fees
and commissions ... "' both for it's public offering services and for transactions
occurring in the secondary market system. Id. An additional device would entitle
purchasers to participate in future offerings in a manner which "would guarantee
[that] investors would be purchasing shares in public offerings at the offering price
and directly from the issuer." Id.
316. Spring Street Brewing Co., Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 1996 No-Action
Letter, available in LEXIS, Fedsec file, 435, SEC-Reply-1 (March 22, 1996).
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keeping and adding information informing investors of the risks
inherent in investing in illiquid securities, such as that the secu-
rities are not traded on a registered exchange.317 Interestingly,
the SEC noted that if the system "post[s] quotations simulta-
neously on both the Buyer and Seller Bulletin Boards" then the
system may be classified as a dealer, and thus required to regis-
ter as such under the applicable federal laws. 18 Finally, the
SEC noted that the sale of securities through the system "ap-
pears to involve an offer or sale" for purposes of the Securities
Act of 1933."' 9 Thus, registration requirements are a con-
cern.3 20 Such a response, while supportive of this "innovative"
trading mechanism, does not clearly delineate the differences be-
tween information, trading, offering and disclosure components.
However, the SEC does suggest that less-than-simultaneous
posting of Buyer-Seller bids will permit trade facilation, and
even trade matching.
The SEC supports the electronic delivery of materials re-
quired under the Securities Acts regulations.32' It also ac-
knowledges that "[a]dvances in computer and electronic media
technology are enabling companies to disseminate information to
more people at a faster and more cost effective rate than tradi-
tional distribution methods ....32  The SEC adds that the
"[ulse of electronic media also enhances the efficiency of the
securities markets by allowing for the rapid dissemination of
information to investors and financial markets in a more cost
efficient, wide-spread and equitable manner than traditional
paper-based methods." 23 Interestingly, the release generally
avoids the issue of delivery of financial information pertaining to




320. Id. The No-Action letter referred Spring Street to the No-Action response to
King and Spaulding regarding the application of 1933 Act registration to such servic-
es. Id. However, the SEC also noted that the Regulation A exemption may be used
in connection with such a service. Id.
321. Use Of Electronic Media For Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release Nos.
33-7233, 34-36,345, IC-21,399, 60 Fed. Reg. 534,582 (Oct. 6, 1995). "The Commission
believes that, given the numerous benefits of electronic distribution of information
and the fact that in many respects it may be more useful to investors than paper,
its use should not be disfavored." Id.
322. Id. at 2.
323. Id. at 4.
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sive fashion that, "[t]he liability provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws apply equally to electronic and paper-based media."32
However, the scope of the statutes application is unclear.
It is clear, however, that the SEC has commenced enforce-
ment actions against promoters who have made unregistered
offers on the Internet. For instance, in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Odulo,325 the SEC announced the filing of a
complaint against a promoter who posted false and misleading
solicitations on the Internet which, as the Commission noted, is
"accessible to hundreds of thousands of individuals across the
country and world-wide."326 While such schemes, often oper-
ated by individuals and small groups, target small investors,
sophisticated investors also frequently fall victim to fraud. As
SEC Commissioner Wallman noted, some of the "frauds are so
egregious it makes you wonder about the level of sophistication
among even supposedly sophisticated investors."327
Traditionally, federal regulations enforce disclosure schemes
by controlling and prohibiting disclosure of financial
information.3 21 Without the ability to regulate global markets,
global securities trading makes control of financial information
as a means of restricting securities transactions difficult. This
creates a number of problems for the SEC. Imposing the U.S.
disclosure scheme on international securities transactions poses
a significant barrier to the integration of U.S. and Latin Ameri-
can securities markets. Yet, the Unites States is committed to
the concept of complete disclosure as essential to investor protec-
tion. Complicating matters is the widespread access of U.S. in-
324. Id. at n.11. The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws as set
forth in § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5, apply to any information delivered electronically. Furthermore, § 17(b) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b)l, applies to any report circulated on
the Internet just as if the report were provided in paper form.
325. Civil Action No. 95-424-P (D.R.I. Aug. 7, 1995).
326. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Odulo, Litigation Release No. 14591
(D.R.I. Aug. 7, 1995). Odulo sought investors for a venture to acquire and raise eels
that, he claimed, was a "very low risk" with an expected "whopping 20%" yield. Id.
327. Federal Securities, supra note 208. For example, '(slince October 1993, the
SEC has filed 10 administrative and 31 injunctive actions targeting prime bank
schemes that lured some 1,200 investors to invest more than $94 million .... "Id.
(quoting SEC Commissioner Steven M.H. Wallman).
328. See Federal Securities, supra note 208, at 331. "The SEC is, in essence, a
regulator of information. " Id. (quoting current SEC Commissioner Steven M.H.
Wallman).
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vestors to global financial information which threatens to cir-
cumvent U.S. disclosure standards, unless there is international
support for such standards. 29 Integration of regulatory re-
gimes may become a practical necessity. The various proposals
and vast support for a hemispheric securities market on U.S.
soil offers the United States an opportunity to take a leadership
role in facilitating such integration as a means of supporting
both regional development and investor protection. Despite SEC
movement in this direction, however, a real question exists as to
whether the United States is ready and capable of sacrificing
elements of its regulatory scheme which will be necessary to
achieve this goal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Permitting Latin American issuer's greater access to U.S.
securities markets is an important policy goal that has wide-
spread support among market participants and regulators. The
integration of international securities trading, and specifically
hemispheric securities markets, is a stated goal of the govern-
ments of North and South America.
While the Securities Exchange Commission has taken a
number of steps to increase foreign participation in U.S. mar-
kets, further efforts are necessary. These efforts must concen-
trate on integration issues, economic factors, market conditions
and investor behavior throughout the region. Experience shows
that similar systems of securities regulation will not necessarily
result in equivalent disclosure. Furthermore, adherence to a par-
ticular system, such as the U.S. scheme, detracts from market
transparency and the availability of high grade foreign stocks.
An approach geared towards ensuring adequate disclosure, as
opposed to a system that mandates comparative disclosure, will
more effectively integrate international markets. The liability
provisions presently in place can be easily tailored to address
misstatements, nondisclosure and fraud under any system.
The various proposals for a Latin American stock exchange
in Miami express both the potential and support for regional
integration of securities markets. However, the differences in
329. See id. SEC Commissioner Wallman acknowledges that the Internet under-
scores the need for greater coordination among international regulators. Id.
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the proposals reflect confusion and uncertainty in how to best
accomplish this goal. Each of the exchange proposals, if institut-
ed, will ensure Miami's status as the gateway to Latin America
and the Caribbean. Given the increase in global competitiveness
that stems from regional partnerships, this goal is of great im-
portance to the United States. In addition, each of the proposals
offers the United States the opportunity and conditions in which
to build a workable and sound integration model that will pro-
vide issuer and investor access to capital and investment oppor-
tunities throughout the hemisphere.
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